e.g. p590-51A432A
Table of Contents
Standards - MicroCode
Microcode Management
Systems without an HMC
Use IBM's
Microcode Discovery Service at the following URL to determine what
microcode should be updated, to retrieve the microcode, and the
instructions for installing the microcode.
https://techsupport.services.ibm.com/server/aix.invscoutMDS
Normally the "java applet" is used to peform the microcode discovery
which requires the password for the user "invscout" to be set. This
also requires internet communication from the system over port 808. To
use the java applet perform the following steps on the target
system:
- Set the password for the user "invscout"
passwd invscout
- Clear the password administration flags on the user "invscout"
pwdadm -c invscout
- Start the "invscout" daemon
invscoutd
- The system is now ready for microcode discovery via the java applet
- The microcode discovery service will require several pieces of
information to be able to perform the survey:
- Fully qualified hostname of the system
- Password for the user "invscout"
- Port number (default: 808)
- System Model Number
lsattr -El sys0 -a modelname -F value
- System Serial Number
lsattr -El sys0 -a systemid -F value
Systems with an HMC
Use the facilities built into the HMC for performing microcode updates
to all managed systems.
Table of Contents
Standards - Storage
Storage Standards
All operating system, application, and data storage in the Mt Xia
environment shall be configured external to the system. The purpose of
this is to increase the recoverability of the system, reduce hardware
related outages, and to centralize the management of storage.
All systems will have multiple hardware paths to the storage, those
paths may be physical or virtual.
Multiple volume groups shall be created in the AIX environment. The
operating system volume group, called "rootvg", will contain only
operating system related applications and files. The "rootvg" will
contain a minimum amount of storage.
The standard "rootvg" will contain a single 9 GB disk that exists on
the SAN and is mirrored by the SAN environment. Multiple paths to the
"rootvg" disk are configured using IBM's Multi-Path I/O (MPIO) device
driver. Optionally, the "rootvg" may have an "alt_disk" that exists on
internal storage. The "alt_disk" is used to perform Operating System
updates.
All non-operating system related programs and data will be stored in
volume groups other than "rootvg". The Volume group names will be
created in accordance with Mt Xia's VG naming
standards and will contain storage as required by the supported
business function.
All non-rootvg volume groups residing on Hitachi SAN based storage
will utilize the latest HDLM driver and multiple hardware paths to the
SAN. The HDLM driver is updated on a regular basis.
Further information regarding Mt Xia's storage standards can be obtained
from the following document:
Unix-Storage-Presentation.pdf
Table of Contents
Standards - Hostname/Alias
Hostname Standards
In order to achieve maximum flexibility during normal operations,
maintenance, disaster recovery, and business continuity efforts, it is
important to provide a naming standard for business functions that can
be translated easily into hostnames and/or aliases. The purpose of
using hostnames instead of IP addresses is that they are easier to
remember and use. Hostnames are not necessary, but usually
desirable.
Normal user access to an application or business function will always
be through an alias. Normal users should never access a system using a
hostname. The reason is for portability and availability. It is easy
to redirect an alias to any host, it is significantly more difficult to
change hostnames. By having the users access required services through
aliases rather than hostnames, the users can be redirected quickly to
available services in the event of a failure.
Hostnames
In Mt Xia's environment, a hostname refers to an IP address, the IP
address is associated with one or more network adapters. It is
important to recognize that an IP address is not necessarily tied to a
network adapter, but may float across adapters and machines. The same
is true with the hostnames. A hostname should be viewed as
being independent from any machine or data center. The
hostname shall be an enterprise wide unique value in order to eliminate
conflicts during manual, automated, or disaster recovery failovers.
The hostname shall consist of exactly 10 characters with the
following structure:
LocationCode + OS Type + Environment + ApplicationCode + SequenceID
3 char + 1 char + 1 char + 3 char + 2 char = 10 char
The detailed information for each component of the resource group
name is described below:
HostName
Component
|
Number of
Characters
|
Values
|
Location Code
|
3
|
dal = Dallas Data Center
bos = Boston Data Center
|
OS Type
|
1
|
a = AIX
s = Sun
|
Environment
|
1
|
a = acceptance
a = pre-production
d = test/development
p = production
t = test
x = disaster recovery
x = pre-production
|
Application Code
|
3
|
atl = Atlas
ega = EGATE
nim = NIM
ora = Oracle
tps = Maximo
vio = Virtual I/O
|
Sequence ID
|
2
|
0-9,A-Z,a-z
|
Examples of Hostnames (HN):
- dalapega01
-
EGATE Production database on AIX at Dallas Data Center, first instance
- dalapega01
-
EGATE Production database on AIX at Dallas Data Center, second instance
- bosapnim01
-
Production Network Information Manager on AIX at Boston Data Center, first instance
- dalapnim01
-
Production Network Information Manager on AIX at Dallas Data Center, first instance
- bosapvio01
-
Production Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Boston Data Center, first instance
- bosapvio02
-
Production Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Boston Data Center, second instance
- bosapvio03
-
Production Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Boston Data Center, third instance
- bosapvio04
-
Production Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Boston Data Center, fourth instance
- dalaavio01
-
Acceptance Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Dallas Data Center, first instance
- dalaavio02
-
Acceptance Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Dallas Data Center, second instance
- dalaavio03
-
Acceptance Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Dallas Data Center, third instance
- dalaavio04
-
Acceptance Virtual I/O Server on AIX at Dallas Data Center, fourth instance
Aliases
The rules for defining alias names are significantly less rigid than
for hostnames. The alias can be any name as long as it is unique within
the domain. This allows the application to be accessed though a name
that makes logical sense to the user. For example, the production EGATE
Application Server at the Dallas Data Center may have a hostname of
"bosapega03", however the alias may be "bosegate". The use of aliases
preserves the structure needed for hostnames and the ease of use desired
by users.
Table of Contents
Standards - HMC
HMC Standards
Contained here are the standards for defining new LPAR's in the
Power5 architecture environment using the Hardware Management Console.
These standards describe the information required to define the LPAR's
and the format in which this information should be presented.
This environment utilizes the VIO server to virtualize the hardware
I/O adapters to client LPAR's, thus allowing multiple LPAR's to share
resources. Implementation of this type of environment requires
extensive up-front design work and planning. Each hardware adapter must
be identified to the VIO server and virtualized for use by each client
LPAR.
To begin configuring this environment, build a spreadsheet to contain
all frame and I/O adapter information, this spreadsheet should contain
at least the following:
Frame Type: |
|
Frame S/N: |
|
System Name: |
|
|
|
CPUs |
|
RAM (GB) |
|
|
|
CUoD CPUs |
|
CUoD RAM (GB) |
|
|
Drawer Serial
|
Bus
|
Slot
|
Adapter
|
LPAR
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Much of this information can be automatically generated using the
script "hmcparse.ksh". Example results
from this script follow:
Server9119590SN51A432B
Drawer Serial |
Bus |
Slot |
Adapter |
LPAR |
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C10
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C10
|
Storage controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C10
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C10
|
Storage controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
Server9119590SN51A432C
Drawer Serial |
Bus |
Slot |
Adapter |
LPAR |
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
13
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
13
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb02
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
13
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
13
|
C10
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
14
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
14
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
14
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
14
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
15
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
15
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
15
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P1
|
15
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
19
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
19
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
19
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
19
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
20
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
20
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
20
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
20
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
21
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
21
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
21
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WR-P2
|
21
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
10
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
10
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb02
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
10
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
10
|
C10
|
Storage controller
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
11
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
11
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
11
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
11
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio04
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
12
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
12
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
12
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P1
|
12
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
16
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
16
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
16
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
16
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
17
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
17
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
17
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
17
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
18
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
18
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
18
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio03
|
U5791.001.91800WY-P2
|
18
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
Server9119590SN51A432B
Drawer Serial |
Bus |
Slot |
Adapter |
LPAR |
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C10
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C10
|
Storage controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
13
|
C10
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
14
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P1
|
15
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
19
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
20
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WT-P2
|
21
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalpocdb01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
10
|
C10
|
Storage controller
|
dalapvio01
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
11
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P1
|
12
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
T6
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C08
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C09
|
Empty slot
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
16
|
C10
|
Other Communications Device
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C01
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C02
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C03
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
17
|
C04
|
PCI 10/100Mbps Ethernet w/ IPSec
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
T5
|
SCSI bus controller
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C05
|
PCI 1Gbps Ethernet
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C06
|
Fibre Channel Serial Bus
|
dalapvio02
|
U5791.001.91800WW-P2
|
18
|
C07
|
Empty slot
|
|
Configuring Virtual Ethernet Adapters
Configuring virtual ethernet adapters for use in Mt Xia's high availability
environment requires configuration of multiple server side ethernet
adapters as well as multiple client side adapters. Each VIO server will
have one server side ethernet adapter that can be shared to all client
LPAR's requiring virtual ethernet adapters.
This document describes a standard for establishing virtual ethernet
adapters in the VIO Server environment. This standard is specific to
the numbering scheme used to identify the VLAN ID's of the virtual
ethernet adapters. The VLAN ID number is also referred to in the HMC as
the PVID number.
This document assumes there are two VIO servers in the environment
and the names of the VIO servers are represented by "*vio0" and
"*vio5".
The VLAN ID numbers will be three digit numbers, each digit
representing a different aspect of the underlying ethernet adapter.
3 Digit VLAN ID Number
First Digit
|
Second Digit
|
Third Digit
|
5: Boot/Service
6: Standby
7: Backup
8: Management
9: Intra-Frame
|
0: Gigabit
5: 10/100
9: Bus
|
0,2,4,6,8: VIO Server with even numbered hostnames
1,3,5,7,9: VIO Server with odd numberd hostnames
|
The first digit of the VLAN ID numbers associated with virtual
ethernet adapters will be used to represent a variety of adapter
purposes. Those purposes include boot, standby, backup, management, and
intra-frame communications.
- 500-599: boot/service
- 600-699: standby
- 700-799: backup
- 800-899: management
- 900-999: intra-frame
The third digit of the three digit VLAN ID number assigned to virtual
ethernet adapters associated with the VIO Server named *vio0 will end
with a number between 0 and 4.
Example: 500, 501, 502, 510, 520, 521, ...
The VLAN ID numbers assigned to virtual ethernet adapters associated
with the VIO Server named *vio5 will end with an odd number beginning at
5.
Example: 505, 506, 507, 515, 525, 526, ...
The second digit of the three digit VLAN ID sequence will represent the
adapter speed, gigabit cards will be represented by 0 thru 4, 10/100
adapters by 5 thru 8, and bus speed adapters by a 9. This digit may be
reconfigured as necessary.
Examples:
Adapter Speed
VLAN ID
|
Adapter Type
|
Adapter Speed
|
VIO Server
|
500
|
Boot 0
|
Gigabit
|
*vio0
|
501
|
Boot 1
|
Gigabit
|
*vio0
|
505
|
Boot 0
|
Gigabit
|
*vio5
|
506
|
Boot 1
|
Gigabit
|
*vio5
|
|
|
|
|
550
|
Boot 0
|
10/100
|
*vio0
|
551
|
Boot 1
|
10/100
|
*vio0
|
555
|
Boot 0
|
10/100
|
*vio5
|
556
|
Boot 1
|
10/100
|
*vio5
|
|
|
|
|
590
|
Boot 0
|
Bus
|
*vio0
|
591
|
Boot 0
|
Bus
|
*vio0
|
595
|
Boot 0
|
Bus
|
*vio5
|
596
|
Boot 1
|
Bus
|
*vio5
|
An LPAR may have multiple adapters of a variety of types, for
example an LPAR that provides database services and is a member of an
HACMP cluster may have boot, standby, management, backup, and
intra-frame virtual adapters as follows:
- Gigabit adapter used for boot/service address
- Gigabit adapter used for standby address
- 10/100 backup adapter
- 10/100 management adapter
- 2 intra-frame adapters
VIO Server Configuration:
VLAN ID
|
Adapter Type
|
Adapter Speed
|
VIO Server
|
500
|
Boot
|
Gigabit
|
*vio0
|
600
|
Standby
|
Gigabit
|
*vio0
|
750
|
Backup
|
10/100
|
*vio0
|
850
|
Management
|
10/100
|
*vio0
|
990
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio0
|
991
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio0
|
|
|
|
|
505
|
Boot
|
Gigabit
|
*vio5
|
605
|
Standby
|
Gigabit
|
*vio5
|
755
|
Backup
|
10/100
|
*vio5
|
855
|
Management
|
10/100
|
*vio5
|
995
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio5
|
996
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio5
|
LPAR VLAN ID configuration to utilize virtual adapters:
VLAN ID
|
Adapter Type
|
Adapter Speed
|
VIO Server
|
500
|
Boot
|
Gigabit
|
*vio0
|
505
|
Boot
|
Gigabit
|
*vio5
|
600
|
Standby
|
Gigabit
|
*vio0
|
605
|
Standby
|
Gigabit
|
*vio5
|
750
|
Backup
|
10/100
|
*vio0
|
755
|
Backup
|
10/100
|
*vio5
|
850
|
Management
|
10/100
|
*vio0
|
855
|
Management
|
10/100
|
*vio5
|
990
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio0
|
991
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio0
|
995
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio5
|
996
|
Intra-frame
|
Bus
|
*vio5
|
This virtual ethernet information can be automatically gathered from an
existing frame through the HMC using the script
"virtualeth.ksh. Example output from
this script follows:
Server9119590SN51A432B
Server9119590SN51A432C
Configuring Virtual SCSI Adapters
Configuration of the virtual I/O adapters requires the knowledge of
disk layouts as well as networking configuration. The virtual SCSI
adapters require server and client side adapters to be configured on the
HMC. The server side portion of the SCSI adapter, configured on the
VIO, requires a frame wide unique "slot number" be defined. For high
availability a server side portion of the SCSI adapter must be
configured for each VIO server. This means that each virtual disk or
logical volume connection is associated with two server side SCSI
adapters, one on each VIO server. By convention the standard has
become that each SCSI adapter is numbered as a multiple of 10, with the
first SCSI adapter of the server side high availability pair being
configured on the first VIO server and ending with the number 0, i.e.,
210, 220, 230, 240, ... The second SCSI adapter of the server side
high availability pair is configured on the second VIO server and ends
with the number 5, i.e., 215, 225, 235, 245, ...
For each LPAR that uses virtual disk or logical volumes, a client
side virtual SCSI adapter must be configured on the HMC. The client
side of the virtual SCSI adapter requires additional information and
it's settings to correspond with the server side of the SCSI adapter.
Coordination of the slot numbers defined here will make debugging and
tracking of problems much easier and is highly desired. The information
required to configure a client side SCSI adapter includes slot number,
the name of the server side SCSI adapter remote partition, and the slot
number of the server side SCSI adapter on the remote partition. The
client side slot number should correspond with the server side slot
number to make debugging and tracking easier. As an example of defining
both server and client side SCSI adapters in a high availability
environment:
For each LPAR, a pair of virtual SCSI adapters shall be configured to
be used for attachment of the operating system and paging disks.
Another pair of virtual SCSI adapters shall be configured for the
purpose of application disk attachment. The virtual SCSI adapters
designated for use as operating system disk attachment shall be numbered
between 10 and 199. The virtual SCSI adapters designated for use as
application disk attachment shall be numbered between 200 and 499.
Using this standard, each VIO server will have one virtual SCSI
adapter per LPAR for the operating system, and one virtual SCSI adapter
per LPAR for the application storage. Each LPAR will reference two
virtual SCSI adapters, one from each VIO server, for the operating
system storage, and two virtual SCSI adapters, one from each VIO server,
for the application storage. Examples of this is shown below.
Example Virtual SCSI Slot Numbers
LPAR |
VIO 0 OS Slot |
VIO 1 OS Slot |
VIO 0 Appl Slot |
VIO 1 Appl Slot |
daladcal01 |
10 |
15 |
200 |
205 |
daladfim03 |
20 |
25 |
210 |
215 |
daladesp01 |
30 |
35 |
220 |
225 |
dalapega01 |
40 |
45 |
230 |
235 |
dalaaora02 |
50 |
55 |
240 |
245 |
Each virtual SCSI adapter may have one or more disks with it,
depending upon the LPAR requirements. These disk associations are
performed on the VIO server by referencing the slot numbers assigned to
each LPAR.
This virtual SCSI adapter information can be automatically gathered
from an existing frame through the HMC using the script
"virtualscsi.ksh. Example output from this
script follows:
Server9119590SN51A432B
Adapter Type |
Slot |
Remote LPAR |
Remote Slot |
Backing Device |
LPAR Name |
server
|
100
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//ap01rootlv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
110
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//ap02rootlv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
120
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//ap03rootlv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
130
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//db01rootlv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
150
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000/U5791.001.91800WT-P1-C06-T1-W50060E8003334713-L1000000000000/hdisk5
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
160
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000/U5791.001.91800WT-P1-C06-T1-W50060E8003334713-L2000000000000/hdisk6
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
170
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000/U5791.001.91800WT-P1-C06-T1-W50060E8003334713-L3000000000000/hdisk7
|
dalapvio01
|
client
|
190
|
dalapvio01
|
190
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
server
|
30
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocap01lv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
40
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocap02lv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
50
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocap03lv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
60
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocdb01lv
|
dalapvio01
|
server
|
105
|
|
any
|
//
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
115
|
|
any
|
//
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
125
|
|
any
|
//
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
135
|
|
any
|
//
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
155
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000/U5791.001.91800WW-P1-C06-T1-W50060E8003334703-L1000000000000/hdisk5
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
165
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000/U5791.001.91800WW-P1-C06-T1-W50060E8003334703-L2000000000000/hdisk6
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
175
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000/U5791.001.91800WW-P1-C06-T1-W50060E8003334703-L3000000000000/hdisk7
|
dalapvio02
|
client
|
195
|
dalapvio02
|
195
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
server
|
35
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocap01lv
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
45
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocap02lv
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
55
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocap03lv
|
dalapvio02
|
server
|
65
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//pocdb01lv
|
dalapvio02
|
client
|
2
|
dalapvio01
|
60
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
3
|
dalapvio02
|
65
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
4
|
dalapvio01
|
130
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
5
|
dalapvio01
|
170
|
none
|
dalpocap03
|
client
|
6
|
dalapvio02
|
175
|
none
|
dalpocap03
|
client
|
2
|
dalapvio01
|
60
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
3
|
dalapvio02
|
65
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
4
|
dalapvio01
|
130
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
5
|
dalapvio01
|
170
|
none
|
dalpocap03
|
client
|
6
|
dalapvio02
|
175
|
none
|
dalpocap03
|
client
|
2
|
dalapvio01
|
60
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
3
|
dalapvio02
|
65
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
4
|
dalapvio01
|
130
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
5
|
dalapvio01
|
170
|
none
|
dalpocap03
|
client
|
6
|
dalapvio02
|
175
|
none
|
dalpocap03
|
client
|
190
|
dalapvio01
|
190
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
195
|
dalapvio02
|
195
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
2
|
dalapvio01
|
60
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
3
|
dalapvio02
|
65
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
client
|
4
|
dalapvio01
|
130
|
none
|
dalpocdb01
|
Server9119590SN51A432C
Adapter Type |
Slot |
Remote LPAR |
Remote Slot |
Backing Device |
LPAR Name |
server
|
140
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//s32Cplmrootlv
|
dalapvio03
|
server
|
145
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//i32Cplmrootlv
|
dalapvio04
|
server
|
130
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//sdb02rootlv
|
dalapvio03
|
server
|
140
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//s32Cplmrootlv
|
dalapvio03
|
client
|
190
|
dalapvio03
|
190
|
none
|
dalpocdb02
|
server
|
145
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//i32Cplmrootlv
|
dalapvio04
|
client
|
195
|
dalapvio04
|
195
|
none
|
dalpocdb02
|
server
|
65
|
|
any
|
0x8100000000000000//db02rootlv
|
dalapvio04
|
client
|
190
|
dalapvio03
|
190
|
none
|
dalpocdb02
|
client
|
195
|
dalapvio04
|
195
|
none
|
dalpocdb02
|
client
|
2
|
dalapvio04
|
65
|
none
|
dalpocdb02
|
client
|
3
|
dalapvio03
|
130
|
none
|
dalpocdb02
|
Table of Contents
Standards - VIO Server
Virtual I/O Server Standards
Defined here are the standards that describe how a Virtual I/O (VIO)
server will be configured in the Mt Xia environment. The purpose of these
standards is to ensure business continuity, disaster recovery, high
availability, serviceability, managability, and supportability of the
virtualized environment.
Procedure to enable centralized statistics gathering from a VIO
server via WLM
The Virtual I/O (VIO) servers should not have extraneous software
installed on them, therefore the performance toolbox software is not
installed or enabled. However the Workload Manager (WLM) is installed
and should be enabled in passive mode. The procedure to enable WLM on
the VIO servers follows:
This procedure assumes there is a centralized storage location for
the WLM statistics shared to the VIO server via NFS. In the following
example the centralized storage is located on the NIM server whose
hostname is "dalapnim01". The specific directory being shared via NFS
from "dalapnim01" is "/prfdmce0".
This procedure also uses an example VIO server hostname of
"daladvio01".
Establish the NFS mount from the centralized NFS storage location.
/usr/sbin/mknfsmnt -f /prfdmce0 -d /prfdmce0 -h dalapnim01-mc2 -M sys -t rw -w bg -ABSXYZ -jqg
Add a directory to the centralized NFS storage location to contain
the statistics files from the VIO server.
mkdir -p /prfdmce0/ddadvio01/wlm
Add a record line to "/etc/inittab" to start the WLM statistics
gathering daemon
mkitab 'ptxwlm:2:respawn:/usr/bin/xmwlm -d /prfdmce0/daladvio01/wlm -n xmwlm > /dev/null 2>&1'
Start the WLM in "passive" mode.
/usr/sbin/wlmcntrl -p > /dev/console 2>&1
Add a record to the "/etc/inittab" to start the WLM at system boot
time.
mkitab -i rc 'wlm:2:once:/usr/sbin/wlmcntrl -p > /dev/console 2>&1'
Table of Contents
Standards - PLM
Partition Load Manager Standards
The Partition Load Manager (PLM) provides CPU and memory
resource management and monitoring across logical partitions (LPARs).
Partition Load Manager allows you to effectively use CPU and Memory
resources by allowing you to set thresholds for designated resources.
When a threshold is exceeded, Partition Load Manager can try to assign
CPU and/or Memory resources to that LPAR by using resources assigned to
other LPARs that are not being used.
Determining which node is more or less deserving of resources is
primarily done by taking into account certain values defined in what is
known as a policy file. This policy file details partitions, their
entitlements, their thresholds, and organizes the partitions into
groups. Every node, but not every LPAR, managed by Partition Load
Manager must be defined in the policy file along with several associated
attribute values. Some of the attributes that are associated with the
node are the maximum, minimum, and guaranteed resource values, variable
share values, and so on. These are the attributes taken into
consideration by Partition Load Manager when a decision is made as to
whether a resource is reallocated from one LPAR to another.
PLM is an automated mechanism for utilizing the Dynamic LPAR (DLPAR)
capabilities of the HMC and requires communication with the HMC. This
means that before PLM will function, DLPAR must be functional on the
HMC. DLPAR requires communication with each LPAR via the Resource
Monitoring and Control (RMC) subsystem.
NOTE: The RMC subsystem is not installed when the
AIX operating system is installed from the NIM server as an "rte"
install.
The following fileset must be installed on every PLM client LPAR to
enable RMC communications with the HMC and PLM:
csm.client
The PLM communications are also dependent upon SSH and SSL and must
be installed on every PLM client LPAR.
Refer to the PLM configuration
procedures for more information
A single PLM server can manage multiple frames across multiple HMC's.
In the Mt Xia environment there is a single primary PLM in each data
center. Within a frame there are two classifications of CPU's,
dedicated and shared. Policy files are used by the PLM to control each
frame and a single policy file will exist for each frame. The policy
file is named for the serial number of each frame. When new frames are
added to Mt Xia's environment, a policy file will be created on the PLM and
the name of the policy file will be the serial number of the frame.
Policy files currently exist with names such as:
- 107CE4E - p520 - Warner Home Video
- 10F6BEE - p570 - Warner Home Video
- 51A432B - p590 - Mt Xia
- 51A432C - p590 - Mt Xia
Every LPAR created in the Mt Xia environment will be managed by a PLM
and will be initially assigned a minimum amount of CPU and memory
resources. This means there will be a policy file on the PLM for every
frame in the data center where the PLM exists.
Within a PLM policy there are two groups to represent the two CPU
classifications, dedicated and shared. Each LPAR will be assigned to one
of these two groups, depending upon what type of CPU's are assigned to
the LPAR.
As a configuration standard, every policy will be configured to
immediately release free CPU and memory resources. Most other
configuration parameters within the PLM will depend upon the LPAR and
application requirements.
Table of Contents
Standards - LPAR
Logical Partition Standards
LPAR, short for logical partitioning, is a mechanism of taking a
computer's total resources - processors, memory and storage -- and
splitting them into smaller units that each can be run with its own
instance of the operating system and applications. Each partition can
communicate with the other partitions as if the other partition is in a
separate machine.
In Mt Xia's environment, the ability to obtain outages for the purpose
of maintenance and upgrades will be difficult. Furthermore, systems
supporting multiple business functions will be even more difficult to
obtain outage windows. Therefore it is desirable to create LPAR's to
support each business function, thus reducing the impact of an outage
upon the overall environment. So rather than creating large LPAR's
supporting multiple business functions for a client, it is preferable to
create multiple LPARs to support each business function.
When creating an LPAR, the following standards will be applied:
- The LPAR name and profile name will be the same as the short
machine name assigned to the LPAR.
- Minimum Memory: 512 MB
- Desired Memory: 512 MB
- Maximum Memory: All available memory
For LPARs that will require 3 physical processors or less during
normal operations:
- Processor Mode: shared
- Minimum processing units: 0.20
- Desired processing units: 0.20
- Maximum processing units: All available CPUs
- Minimum Virtual Processors: 2
- Desired Virtual Processors: 2
- Maximum Virtual Processors: 30
For LPARs that will require more than 3 physical processors during
normal operation:
- Processor Mode: shared
- Minimum processing units: 1.00
- Desired processing units: 1.00
- Maximum processing units: All available CPUs
- Minimum Virtual Processors: 2
- Desired Virtual Processors: 2
- Maximum Virtual Processors: 64
Physical I/O will be assigned as required by the business functions
supported by by each LPAR, Virtual I/O will be assigned as required by
each LPAR and in accordance with Mt Xia's VIO
standards. Connection monitoring will be enabled for each LPAR and
no LPARs will be started automatically when the frame is powered on.
Table of Contents
Standards - NIM
Network Information Manager Standards
Features
NIM permits the installation and maintenance of AIX, its basic
operating system, and additional software and fixes that may be applied
over a period of time over token-ring, ethernet, FDDI, and ATM net
works.
NIM also permits the customization of machines both during and after
installation . As a result, NIM has eliminated the reliance on tapes and
CD-ROMs for software installation; the onus, in NIM’sase, is on the
network. NIM will allow one machine to act as a master in the
environment. This machine will be responsible for storing information
about the clients it supports, the resources it or other servers provide
to these clients, and the networks on which they operate.
Benefits
Some of the benefits of NIM are:
- Manageability - It allows central localization of
software installation images, thus, making backup and administration
easier.
- Central Administration - Administrators can install
remote AIX machines without having to physically attend them.
- Scalability - You can install more than one
machine at a time, implement a group strategy of machines and resources,
and choose how many machines to install at a time.
- Usability - VSM GUI for NIM has been improved so
that, now, it can be used to configure NIM groups.
- Availability - Where server down time means loss
of profits, NIM provides you with a backup image of all your servers. A
new server can be set up and running in just over an hour.
- Non-prompted installation - NIM provides a
function to install systems without having to go to the machine, thus,
avoiding the sneaker net method.
Installations can be initiated by either the client or master at a
convenient time. For example, if a client is unavailable at the time of
the install, you can initiate an install when it is back on line, or, if
there is less traffic on your network at a certain time, you can
initiate the installations to occur then.
It is a relatively faster means of installation than tape or CD-ROM.
NIM provides greater functionality than CD-ROM or tape. Among other
things, it allows you to customize an install, initiate a non-prompted
install, or install additional software.
Mt Xia's NIM Environment
NIM Server Machines
Each data center currently has one NIM server which serves various
resources to the client machines in that data center. Some cross data
center communication occurs for the purpose of disaster recovery. The
NIM Server machines are:
- Boston Data Center: bosapnim01.tu.com
- Dallas Data Center: dalapnim01.tu.com
No NIM Alternate-Master servers are currently configured, but will
be implemented soon. This capability will provide automated redundancy
of NIM resources between data centers.
NIM Client Machines
All AIX and linux machines in the Mt Xia enviroment utilize resources
originating from the NIM Servers.
NIM Resources
The resources available from the NIM servers include operating
systems, OS updates, OS backup and restores, clustering software,
applications, device drivers, firmware, and disaster recovery services
and information. These resources can be delivered from any NIM server
to any NIM client in any Mt Xia data center. Some of the resources
available on the NIM Servers include:
- AIX
- Linux
- mksysb repository
- AIX Maintenance Levels
- AIX APAR's
- AIX Fixes
- HACMP
- HACMP-ES
- MQ Series Software
- Tivoli Storage Manager Software
- Linux Toolbox for AIX
- freeware
- Hitachi Sofware
- Performance monitoring software
- firmware updates
- Disaster Recovery hub for AIX
NIM Server Operations
Using the resources previously listed, a wide variety of operations
may be peformed on or by a NIM client. These operations include the
ability to perform a bare-metal install of a new operating sytem or
backup. Other operating system installation options are also available,
dependent only upon what the system administrator is attempting to
accomplish. For example, using the NIM server, a backup of a production
machine can be performed, the backup restored to an alternate-disk on
the same production machine, and the operating system on the
alternate-disk can be updated to the latest maintenance level, all without
interuption or downtime to the production machine. Some of the
operations that are regularly performed utilizing the resources provided
by the NIM servers include:
Network boot server
AIX operating system installation
AIX operating system maintenance level updates
AIX operating system APAR updates
AIX operating system efix updates
AIX mksysb repository
AIX mksysb installation
AIX alt-clone installation
AIX alt-clone maintenance level updates
AIX alt-disk installation
Linux operating system installation
Linux operating rpm updates
Oracle database installation
Application installation and updates
Script Server
Disaster Recovery information gathering
Disaster Recovery information distribution
Disaster Recovery automated documentation generator
NIM Server Structure
To maintain structure and order on the NIM Servers, a specific
directory hierarchy has been adopted and utilized. This structure must
be observed and practiced when making modifications to the resources
provided by the NIM Servers.
The top level directory for storage of NIM resources begins at the
directory:
/export
Each resource class provided by the NIM server should exist as a
subdirectory under /export
. The list of valid NIM resource
classes are:
- boot: represents the network boot resource
- nim_script: directory containing customization scripts created by NIM
- spot: Shared Product Object Tree - equivalent to /usr/filesystem
- root: parent directory for client / (root) directories
- paging: parent directory for client paging files
- dump: parent directory for client dump files
- home: parent directory for client /home directories
- shared_home: home directory shared by clients
- tmp: parent directory for client /tmp directories
- exclude_files: files to be excluded when creating a mksysb or savevg image
- lpp_source: source device for optional product images
- installp_bundle: installp bundle file
- fix_bundle: fix (keyword) input file for the cust or fix_query operation
- bosinst_data: config file used during base system installation
- image_data: config file used during base system installation
- vg_data: config file used during volume group restoration
- mksysb: a mksysb image
- script: an executable file which is executed on a client
- resolv_conf: configuration file for name-server information
- savevg: a savevg image
- adapter_def: directory containing secondary adapter definition files
- fb_script: an executable script added to /etc/firstboot and run at first reboot after bos install to configure devices.
Not all NIM resource classes are currently utilized, however when a
new resource is utilized, this guide should be followed for the
directory naming structure.
The currently implemented NIM resource classes and class instances
follow. Naming conventions for class instances are included here and
should be adhered to when new class instances are created:
Currently implemented NIM Resource's
- /export/bosinst_data
-
The "bosinst_data" resource class is for the configuration files used
during the AIX base operating system installation. The default instance
shall be named "bosinst_data
". Additional instances shall
be suffixed with unique identifying information such as the AIX
Operating System version number, machine name, user name, application
name, etc. Example instances of the "bosinst_data
"
resource class and file follow:
bosinst_data Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version ID
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
Default
|
|
bosinst_data
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
noprompt
|
|
bosinst_data_noprompt
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_noprompt
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
bosmtxapp52
|
|
bosinst_data_bosmtxapp52
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_bosmtxapp52
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
egate
|
|
bosinst_data_egate
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_egate
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
4330
|
|
bosinst_data_4330
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_4330
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
4330
|
10
|
bosinst_data_4330-10
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_4330-10
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
4330
|
11
|
bosinst_data_4330-11
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_4330-11
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
4330
|
09
|
bosinst_data_4330-09
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_4330-09
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
4330
|
10.5
|
bosinst_data_4330-10_5
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_4330-10_5
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5100
|
|
bosinst_data_5100
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5100
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5100
|
02
|
bosinst_data_5100-02
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5100-02
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5200
|
|
bosinst_data_5200
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5200
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5200
|
01
|
bosinst_data_5200-01
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5200-01
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5200
|
02
|
bosinst_data_5200-02
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5200-02
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5200
|
04
|
bosinst_data_5200-04
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5200-04
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5200
|
05
|
bosinst_data_5200-05
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5200-05
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5300
|
|
bosinst_data_5300
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5300
|
Base OS Install Data
|
bosinst_data
|
5300
|
01
|
bosinst_data_5300-01
|
/export/bosinst_data/bosinst_data_5300-01
|
When adding an instance of this class to the NIM server, the name of
the instance shall contain the prefix "bosinst_data" followed by an
underscore "_" and will be suffixed with a unique identifier. The file
names used to store the resource shall correspond exactly with the name
used to define the resource in the NIM server.
- /export/image.data
-
The "image_data" resource class is for the configuration files used
during the AIX base operating system installation. The default instance
shall be named "image_data
". Additional instances shall
be suffixed with unique identifying information such as the AIX
Operating System version number, machine name, user name, application
name, etc. Example instances of the "image_data
"
resource class and file follow:
image_data Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version ID
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
Default
|
|
image_data
|
/export/image_data/image_data
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
noprompt
|
|
image_data_noprompt
|
/export/image_data/image_data_noprompt
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
bosmtxapp52
|
|
image_data_bosmtxapp52
|
/export/image_data/image_data_bosmtxapp52
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
egate
|
|
image_data_egate
|
/export/image_data/image_data_egate
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
4330
|
|
image_data_4330
|
/export/image_data/image_data_4330
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
4330
|
10
|
image_data_4330-10
|
/export/image_data/image_data_4330-10
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
4330
|
11
|
image_data_4330-11
|
/export/image_data/image_data_4330-11
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
4330
|
09
|
image_data_4330-09
|
/export/image_data/image_data_4330-09
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
4330
|
10.5
|
image_data_4330-10_5
|
/export/image_data/image_data_4330-10_5
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5100
|
|
image_data_5100
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5100
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5100
|
02
|
image_data_5100-02
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5100-02
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5200
|
|
image_data_5200
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5200
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5200
|
01
|
image_data_5200-01
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5200-01
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5200
|
02
|
image_data_5200-02
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5200-02
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5200
|
04
|
image_data_5200-04
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5200-04
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5200
|
05
|
image_data_5200-05
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5200-05
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5300
|
|
image_data_5300
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5300
|
Base OS Install Data
|
image_data
|
5300
|
01
|
image_data_5300-01
|
/export/image_data/image_data_5300-01
|
When adding an instance of this class to the NIM server, the name of
the instance shall contain the prefix "image_data" followed by an
underscore "_" and will be suffixed with a unique identifier. The file
names used to store the resource shall correspond exactly with the name
used to define the resource in the NIM server.
- /export/lpp_source
-
Software filesets and updates are identified in the NIM server as an
"lpp_source
". The top level directory location to be used
for storage of these resources will be
"/export/lpp_source
". The storage location of these
resources will be further divided into subdirectories such as
"aix
", "hacmp
", "hitachi
",
etc.
- /export/lpp_source/aix
-
The "lpp_source
" resources stored in the
"aix
" subdirectory shall be those that are directly related
to the AIX operating system. The "lpp_source
" resources
stored in this directory may consist of a number of different types
including the AIX operating system, AIX device drivers, AIX expansion
packs, Partition Load Manager, Virtual I/O Server, and others. The
following identifiers will be used when defining the lpp_source of this
type on the NIM Server and when creating directories to store the
lpp_source on the NIM Server:
- aix: AIX Operating System
- aixdoc: AIX Documentation
- dev: AIX Device Drivers
- exppack: AIX Expansion Pack
- plm: Partition Load Manager
- vio: Virtual I/O Server
Each AIX "lpp_source
" resource shall be stored in a
subdirectory. The name of the resource and subdirectory shall have
the following specific format:
The resource identifier (aix, aixdoc, dev, exppack, plm,
vio) followed by an underscore "_", followed by the four(4) digit
version number of the resource. If the version number of the resource
is less than four(4) digits, add zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit
number. If the "lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance
level, then add a dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance
level number. Base level filesets will not have a maintenance level
associated with them. The directory location names for the resource
shall correspond exactly with the resource name used in the NIM
server.
AIX lpp_source Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
4330
|
|
aix_4330
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_4330
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
4330
|
10
|
aix_4330-10
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_4330-10
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
4330
|
11
|
aix_4330-11
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_4330-11
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
4330
|
09
|
aix_4330-09
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_4330-09
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
4330
|
10.5
|
aix_4330-10_5
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_4330-10_5
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5100
|
|
aix_5100
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5100
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5100
|
02
|
aix_5100-02
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5100-02
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5200
|
|
aix_5200
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5200
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5200
|
01
|
aix_5200-01
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5200-01
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5200
|
02
|
aix_5200-02
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5200-02
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5200
|
04
|
aix_5200-04
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5200-04
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5200
|
05
|
aix_5200-05
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5200-05
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5300
|
|
aix_5300
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5300
|
AIX Operating System
|
aix
|
5300
|
01
|
aix_5300-01
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aix_5300-01
|
AIX Documentation
|
aixdoc
|
5300
|
|
aixdoc_5300
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/aixdoc_5300
|
AIX Device Drivers
|
dev
|
4330
|
|
dev_4330
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/dev_4330
|
AIX Device Drivers
|
dev
|
5100
|
|
dev_5100
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/dev_5100
|
AIX Device Drivers
|
dev
|
5200
|
|
dev_5200
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/dev_5200
|
AIX Expansion Pack
|
exppack
|
5300
|
|
exppack_5300
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/exppack_5300
|
Partition Load Manager
|
plm
|
1100
|
|
plm_1100
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/plm_1100
|
Virtual I/O Server
|
vio
|
1100
|
|
vio_1100
|
/export/lpp_source/aix/vio_1100
|
- /export/lpp_source/hacmp
-
The "lpp_source
" resources stored in the
"hacmp
" subdirectory shall be those that are directly
related to the HACMP Clustering Software, this does NOT include HACMP
ES. The "lpp_source
" resources stored in this directory
will consist of a number of different versions of the HACMP Clustering
software.
Each HACMP "lpp_source
" resource shall be stored in a
subdirectory. The name of the resource and subdirectory shall have
the following specific format:
The resource identifier (hacmp)
followed by an underscore "_", followed by the four(4) digit
version number of the resource. If the version number of the resource
is less than four(4) digits, add zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit
number. If the "lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance
level, then add a dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance
level number. Base level filesets will not have a maintenance level
associated with them. The directory location names for the resource
shall correspond exactly with the resource name used in the NIM
server.
HACMP lpp_source Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
HACMP
|
hacmp
|
4500
|
|
hacmp_4500
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmp/hacmp_4500
|
- /export/lpp_source/hacmpes
-
The "lpp_source
" resources stored in the
"hacmpes
" subdirectory shall be those that are directly related
to the HACMP ES Clustering Software. The "lpp_source
" resources
stored in this directory will consist of a number of different versions
of the HACMP ES Clustering software.
Each HACMP ES "lpp_source
" resource shall be stored in a
subdirectory. The name of the resource and subdirectory shall have
the following specific format:
The resource identifier (hacmpes)
followed by an underscore "_", followed by the four(4) digit
version number of the resource. If the version number of the resource
is less than four(4) digits, add zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit
number. If the "lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance
level, then add a dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance
level number. Base level filesets will not have a maintenance level
associated with them. The directory location names for the resource
shall correspond exactly with the resource name used in the NIM
server.
HACMP ES lpp_source Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
4400
|
|
hacmpes_4400
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_4400
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
4410
|
|
hacmpes_4410
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_4410
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
4410
|
01
|
hacmpes_4410-01
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_4410-01
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
4419
|
|
hacmpes_4419
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_4419
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
4500
|
|
hacmpes_4500
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_4500
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
4507
|
|
hacmpes_4507
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_4507
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
5100
|
|
hacmpes_5100
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_5100
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
5200
|
|
hacmpes_5200
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_5200
|
HACMP ES
|
hacmpes
|
5200
|
01
|
hacmpes_5200-01
|
/export/lpp_source/hacmpes/hacmpes_5200-01
|
- /export/lpp_source/hitachi
-
The "lpp_source
" resources stored in the
"hitachi
" subdirectory shall be those that are directly
related to the Hitachi SAN Subsystems. The "lpp_source
"
resources stored in this directory may consist of a number of different
types including the AIX ODM software, DLM Drivers, HDLM Drivers,
Hitachi's MPIO Drivers, and Hitachi's performance monitoring software.
The following identifiers will be used when defining the lpp_source of
this type on the NIM Server and when creating directories to store the
lpp_source on the NIM Server:
- aixodm: Hitachi's AIX ODM Software
- dlm: DLM Drivers
- hdlm: HDLM Drivers
- hdsmpio: Hitachi's MPIO Drivers
- lunstat: Performance Monitoring
Each Hitachi "lpp_source
" resource shall be stored in a
subdirectory. The name of the resource and subdirectory shall have
the following specific format:
The resource identifier (aixodm, dlm, hdlm, hdsmpio, lunstat)
followed by an underscore "_", followed by the four(4) digit
version number of the resource. The version number of the Hitachi
filesets should be taken from the filenames, NOT from the media on
which the software was delivered. If the version number of the resource
is less than four(4) digits, add zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit
number. If the "lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance
level, then add a dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance
level number. Base level filesets will not have a maintenance level
associated with them. The directory location names for the resource
shall correspond exactly with the resource name used in the NIM
server.
Hitachi lpp_source Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
AIX ODM Software
|
aixodm
|
5000
|
|
aixodm_5000
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/aixodm_5000
|
AIX ODM Software
|
aixodm
|
5001
|
|
aixodm_5001
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/aixodm_5001
|
AIX ODM Software
|
aixodm
|
5002
|
|
aixodm_5002
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/aixodm_5002
|
AIX ODM Software
|
aixodm
|
5004
|
|
aixodm_5004
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/aixodm_5004
|
AIX ODM Software
|
aixodm
|
5014
|
|
aixodm_5014
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/aixodm_5014
|
DLM Drivers
|
dlm
|
2430
|
|
dlm_2430
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/dlm_2430
|
DLM Drivers
|
dlm
|
2530
|
|
dlm_2530
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/dlm_2530
|
HDLM Drivers
|
hdlm
|
5024
|
|
hdlm_5024
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/hdlm_5024
|
HDLM Drivers
|
hdlm
|
5112
|
|
hdlm_5112
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/hdlm_5112
|
HDLM Drivers
|
hdlm
|
5231
|
|
hdlm_5231
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/hdlm_5231
|
HDLM Drivers
|
hdlm
|
5251
|
|
hdlm_5251
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/hdlm_5251
|
HDLM Drivers
|
hdlm
|
5411
|
|
hdlm_5411
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/hdlm_5411
|
Hitachi MPIO Driver
|
hdsmpio
|
5400
|
|
hdsmpio_5400
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/hdsmpio_5400
|
Performance Monitoring
|
lunstat
|
122
|
|
lunstat_122
|
/export/lpp_source/hitachi/lunstat_122
|
- /export/lpp_source/mqseries
-
The "lpp_source
" resources stored in the
"mqseries
" subdirectory shall be those that are directly
related to the MQ Series software. Each MQ Series
"lpp_source
" resource shall be stored in a subdirectory.
The name of the resource and subdirectory shall have the following
specific format:
The resource identifier (mq) followed by an underscore
"_", followed by the four(4) digit version number of the resource. If
the version number of the resource is less than four(4) digits, add
zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit number. If the
"lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance level, then add a
dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance level number. Base
level filesets will not have a maintenance level associated with them.
The directory location names for the resource shall correspond exactly
with the resource name used in the NIM server.
MQ Series lpp_source Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
MQ Series
|
mq
|
5300
|
|
mq_5300
|
/export/lpp_source/mqseries/mq_5300
|
- /export/lpp_source/performance
-
The "lpp_source
" resources stored in the
"performance
" subdirectory shall be those that are related
to performance monitoring and management. Each Performance related
"lpp_source
" resource shall be stored in a subdirectory.
The name of the resource and subdirectory will depend upon the resource
and may deviate from those identified in this document. The resource
identifiers shall have the following specific format:
The resource identifier (perfaide, perftoolbox, etc)
followed by an underscore "_", followed by the four(4) digit version
number of the resource. If the version number of the resource is less
than four(4) digits, add zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit number.
If the "lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance level, then
add a dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance level number.
Base level filesets will not have a maintenance level associated with
them. The directory location names for the resource shall correspond
exactly with the resource name used in the NIM server.
Performance related lpp_source Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
Performance
|
perfaide
|
3100
|
|
perfaide_3100
|
/export/lpp_source/performance/perfaide_3100
|
Performance
|
perftoolbox
|
3100
|
|
perftoolbox_3100
|
/export/lpp_source/performance/perftoolbox_3100
|
- /export/lpp_source/tsm
-
The "lpp_source
" resources stored in the
"tsm
" subdirectory shall be those that are directly related
to the Tivoli Storage Manager(TSM). The "lpp_source
" resources
stored in this directory will consist of a number of different versions
of the TSM software.
Each TSM "lpp_source
" resource shall be stored in a
subdirectory. The name of the resource and subdirectory shall have
the following specific format:
The resource identifier (tsmclient,tsmserver)
followed by an underscore "_", followed by the four(4) digit
version number of the resource. If the version number of the resource
is less than four(4) digits, add zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit
number. If the "lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance
level, then add a dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance
level number. Base level filesets will not have a maintenance level
associated with them. The directory location names for the resource
shall correspond exactly with the resource name used in the NIM
server.
Tivoli Storage Manager related lpp_source Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
TSM
|
tsmclient
|
42125
|
|
tsmclient_42125
|
/export/lpp_source/tsm/tsmclient_42125
|
TSM
|
tsmclient
|
4221
|
|
tsmclient_4221
|
/export/lpp_source/tsm/tsmclient_4221
|
TSM
|
tsmclient
|
5162
|
|
tsmclient_5162
|
/export/lpp_source/tsm/tsmclient_5162
|
- /export/mksysb
-
The "mksysb" resource class is for AIX mksysb backups of the "rootvg"
volume group. "mksysb" resources can be used by the NIM server to
perform a new installation or restore a machine to a known state. The
"mksysb" images are specific to an individual machine at a particular
point in time.
Each "mksysb
" resource shall be stored under the
"/export/mksysb" subdirectory. The name of the resource shall have the
following specific format:
The resource identifier (mksysb) followed by an
underscore "_", followed by the machine name from which the "mksysb"
image was generated. If multiple versions are desired, follow the
machine name with an underscore "_", followed by the 4 digit year, 2
digit month number, 2 digit day of the month, 2 digit hour of the day, 2
digit minute of the hour, and 2 digit seconds. If this level of
granularity is not required, the date/time identifer can be truncated as
necessary, but should remain in the stated sequence and format.
mksysb Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Originating Machine
|
Date/Time Stamp
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
Backup
|
mksysb
|
dalaaega01
|
|
mksysb_dalaaega01
|
/export/mksysb/mksysb_dalaaega01
|
Backup
|
mksysb
|
dalaaega02
|
|
mksysb_dalaaega02
|
/export/mksysb/mksysb_dalaaega02
|
Backup
|
mksysb
|
dalpocdb01
|
|
mksysb_dalpocdb01
|
/export/mksysb/mksysb_dalpocdb01
|
Backup
|
mksysb
|
bosmtxapp80
|
20050412
|
mksysb_bosmtxapp80_20050412
|
/export/mksysb/mksysb_bosmtxapp80_20050412
|
Backup
|
mksysb
|
bosmtxapp80
|
20050414
|
mksysb_bosmtxapp80_20050414
|
/export/mksysb/mksysb_bosmtxapp80_20050414
|
- /export/resolv_conf
-
The "resolv_conf" resource class is the configuration file for the
Domain Name Server (DNS) information. A instance of this class shall be
defined for each data center and may contain DNS information for
multiple data centers. Example instances of the
"resolv_conf
" resource class and file follow:
resolv_conf Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Datacenter ID
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
DNS Resolution
|
resolv_conf
|
Default
|
|
resolv_conf
|
/export/resolv_conf/resolv_conf
|
DNS Resolution
|
resolv_conf
|
dal
|
|
resolv_conf_dal
|
/export/resolv_conf/resolv_conf_dal
|
DNS Resolution
|
resolv_conf
|
bos
|
|
resolv_conf_bos
|
/export/resolv_conf/resolv_conf_bos
|
When adding an instance of this class to the NIM server, the name of
the instance shall contain the prefix "resolv_conf" followed by an
underscore "_" and will be suffixed with a unique identifier. The file
names used to store the resource shall correspond exactly with the name
used to define the resource in the NIM server.
- /export/spot
-
The "spot" resource class is for the bootable images to use for
network booting a machine and OS installation. Each "spot" image is
specific to a particular version and maintenance level of AIX or other
operating system and shall be identified accordingly. The resource
identifier for the AIX "spot" images is "aixspot". The reason "aixspot"
is used for this identifier instead of just "spot" is because Linux
spots are also be included in this resource class and are identified by
the brand of Linux such as "susespot", "redhatspot", "debianspot", etc.
These resource identifiers shall be be used to identify each instance as
follows:
The resource identifier (aixspot) followed by an
underscore "_", followed by the four(4) digit version number of the AIX
OS resource. If the version number of the resource is less than four(4)
digits, add zero's(0) to make it a four(4) digit number. If the
"lpp_source
" resource is a maintenance level, then add a
dash "-" followed by the two(2) digit maintenance level number. Base
level filesets will not have a maintenance level associated with them.
The directory location names for the resource shall correspond exactly
with the resource name used in the NIM server.
Spot Resource Names and Subdirectories
Resource Type
|
Resource Identifier
|
Version Number
|
Maintenance Level
|
NIM
Resource Name
|
Storage Location
|
AIX Spot
|
aixspot
|
4330
|
|
aixspot_4330
|
/export/spot/aixspot_4330
|
AIX Spot
|
aixspot
|
5100
|
|
aixspot_5100
|
/export/spot/aixspot_5100
|
AIX Spot
|
aixspot
|
5200
|
|
aixspot_5200
|
/export/spot/aixspot_5200
|
AIX Spot
|
aixspot
|
5200
|
02
|
aixspot_5200-02
|
/export/spot/aixspot_5200-02
|
AIX Spot
|
aixspot
|
5200
|
05
|
aixspot_5200-05
|
/export/spot/aixspot_5200-05
|
AIX Spot
|
aixspot
|
5300
|
|
aixspot_5300
|
/export/spot/aixspot_5300
|
Suse Spot
|
slesspot
|
9000
|
|
slesspot_9000
|
/export/spot/slesspot_9000
|
Table of Contents
Standards - Resource Group
Resource Group Name Standards
The concept of Resource Group is used here in a
larger scope than it is used in HACMP. In Mt Xia's environment, a resource
group is any logical collection of resources, this may include disk,
I/O, users, applications, etc. A resource group should be
viewed as being independent from any machine or data center.
The resource group name is used as the basis of all other naming
structures for all entities whether or not they are controlled by HACMP.
The resource group name shall be an enterprise wide unique value in
order to eliminate conflicts during manual, automated, or disaster
recovery failovers.
When designing any new system, the first step is to determine the
resource group name(s). The names of volume groups, logical volumes,
mount points, major numbers, WLM classes, etc, are all derived from the
resource group name(s).
The resource group name shall consist of exactly 8 characters
with the following structure:
ApplicationCode + Environment + Function + Company + Sequence ID
3 char + 1 char + 1 char + 2 char + 1 char
The detailed information for each component of the resource group
name is described below:
RG Name
Component
|
Number of
Characters
|
Values
|
Application Code
|
3
|
atl = Atlas
ega = EGATE
nim = NIM
ora = Oracle
tps = Maximo
vio = Virtual I/O
|
Environment
|
1
|
a = acceptance
a = pre-production
d = test/development
p = production
t = test
x = disaster recovery
x = pre-production
|
Function
|
1
|
a = application
c = combination/multi-purpose
d = database
m = management
u = utility
|
Company
|
2
|
mx = Mt Xia
mi = Mt Xia - India
ib = IBM
tw = Time Warner
cg = Capgemini
|
Sequence ID
|
1
|
0-9,A-Z,a-z
|
Examples of Resource Group (RG) names:
- egapdmx0
-
EGATE Production database RG for Mt Xia, first instance
- egapdmx1
-
EGATE Production database RG for Mt Xia, second instance
- nimpuib0
-
Network Information Manager production utility RG for IBM, first instance
- nimpuib1
-
Network Information Manager production utility RG for IBM, second instance
- viopuib1
-
Virtual I/O production utility RG for IBM, first instance
- viopuib2
-
Virtual I/O production utility RG for IBM, second instance
- viopuib3
-
Virtual I/O production utility RG for IBM, third instance
- viopuib4
-
Virtual I/O production utility RG for IBM, fourth instance
- vioauib1
-
Virtual I/O acceptance utility RG for IBM, first instance
- vioauib2
-
Virtual I/O acceptance utility RG for IBM, second instance
- vioauib3
-
Virtual I/O acceptance utility RG for IBM, third instance
- vioauib4
-
Virtual I/O acceptance utility RG for IBM, fourth instance
- tpspdmx0
-
Maximo production database RG for Mt Xia, first instance
- tpspdmx1
-
Maximo production database RG for IBM, second instance
Table of Contents
Standards - WLM AIX 433
Workload Manager for AIX 4.3.3.0 Standards
This document describes the Workload Manager implementation
standards on AIX 4.3.3.0 machines only.
For WLM implementation on
AIX version 5 systems, see the AIX 5 WLM
standards document.
The workload manager (WLM) shall be implemented on all AIX systems.
On most systems WLM will be running in "passive" mode, which does not
limit resources. In Mt Xia's environment, only a few selected systems will
have WLM implemented in "active" mode to control and regulate resources.
If there is any question as to whether WLM should be implemented in
"active" or "passive" mode, default to "passive".
The WLM provides a mechanism to classify and segment resources by
process, user, group, etc. The classification scheme must be
constructed by the AIX system administrator. This WLM classification
scheme in the Mt Xia environment is based on the concept of the Resource
Group. Each Resource Group will be represented in WLM as a class.
Multiple instances of an application within a single resource group
shall be represented in WLM as subclasses.
In order to configure WLM, the system administrator must first
define the resource groups names. Once
the resource group names have been defined, then a WLM class must be
defined using the resource group name as the WLM class name.
To define a new WLM class using smitty, start smitty using the "wlm"
fastpath.
smitty wlm
Select "Add a class" to define a new WLM class.
Workload Management
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
List all Classes
Add a Class
Change / Show Characteristics of a Class
Remove a Class
Class Assignment Rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Enter the resource group name as the WLM class name, and provide a
description of this WLM class. The Tier level will normally be 0 (zero)
unless there is a specific reason to change this. The CPU and Memory
values will be defaulted to a minumum of 0% and a maximum value of
100%.
Add a Class
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
Class name [atladmx1]
Description [Atlas pre-prod Database for Mt Xia, instance 1]
Tier [0]
Minimum CPU time (%) [0]
Maximum CPU time (%) [100]
Shares of CPU [1]
Minimum Memory (%) [0]
Maximum Memory (%) [100]
Shares of Memory [1]
Class rules are used to determine which processes are assigned to
which WLM classes and the order of the rules is significant. The first
rule that matches is used to determine the WLM class assignment, so the
class rules should be ordered from highly specific to less specific.
To define WLM class rules using smitty, start smitty using the "wlm"
fastpath.
smitty wlm
Select "Class assignment rules" to define a new WLM class.
Workload Management
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
List all Classes
Add a Class
Change / Show Characteristics of a Class
Remove a Class
Class Assignment Rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Select "Class assignment rules" to define a new WLM class rule.
Class Assignment Rules
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
List all Rules
Create a new Rule
Change / Show Characteristics of a Rule
Delete a Rule
In the following example, a rule is defined to assign all processes
owned by oracl817 to the the WLM class "atladmx1". Again the order of
the rules is important. The rules should be ranked in order of highly
specific, starting at 1, to less specific.
Create a new Rule
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
* Order of the Rule [1]
* Class [atladmx1]
User [oracl817]
Group [-]
Application [-]
Under AIX 4.3.3.0, to start WLM in passive mode, it
must be done from the command line. If WLM is started from "smitty", it
will be started in "active" mode. So to be safe and exact, always
start/stop WLM from the command line using the appropriate flags.
To start WLM from the command line in "passive" mode:
wlmcntrl -p
To start WLM from the command line in "active" mode:
wlmcntrl -a
To stop WLM from the command:
wlmcntrl -o
Any changes to the WLM configuration will require that WLM be stopped
and restarted in order for the changes to take effect.
An example WLM configuration of the Atlas pre-production Database
server for Mt Xia follows. The "standard" WLM configuration for this
machine contains five WLM classes. It is important to recognize that
the "standard" WLM configuration will be different for every machine.
The term "standard" is used in reference to the local machine, this is
not enterprise wide terminology used here.
The AIX 4.3.3.0 WLM does not support the concept of subclasses,
therefore multiple instances of an application will likely be configured
as multiple WLM classes, requiring multiple resource groups. Since the
AIX 4.3.3.0 WLM does not support subclasses, the WLM configuration will
be different between AIX 4.3.3.0 and AIX 5.X systems.
- daladatl01:/etc/wlm/standard/classes
-
System:
Default:
atladmx1:
description = "Atlas pre-prod Database for Mt Xia, AMST instance"
atladtu2:
description = "Atlas pre-prod Database for Mt Xia, C2KR instance"
atladtu3:
description = "Atlas pre-prod Database for Mt Xia, ATLP instance"
The class rules associated with this "standard" configuration assign
processes to multiple classes depending upon the user id. Rules are
defined to segment the processes owned by the three oracle instances
into separate WLM classes. All processes owned by "root" are assigned
to the class "System", and all other processes are assigned to the class
"Default".
- daladatl01:/etc/wlm/standard/rules
-
* class resvd user group application
atladmx1 - oracl817 - -
atladtu2 - oracle8i - -
atladtu3 - oracle - -
System - root - -
Default - - - -
Table of Contents
Standards - WLM AIX 5
Workload Manager for AIX 5L Standards
This document describes the Workload Manager implementation
standards on AIX version 5 machines only.
For WLM implementation on
AIX version 4.3.3.0 systems, see the AIX 4.3.3.0 WLM
standards document.
The workload manager (WLM) shall be implemented on all AIX systems.
On most systems WLM will be running in "passive" mode, which does not
limit resources. In Mt Xia's environment, only a few selected systems will
have WLM implemented in "active" mode to control and regulate resources.
If there is any question as to whether WLM should be implemented in
"active" or "passive" mode, default to "passive".
The WLM provides a mechanism to classify and segment resources by
process, user, group, etc. The classification scheme must be
constructed by the AIX system administrator. This WLM classification
scheme in the Mt Xia environment is based on the concept of the Resource
Group. Each Resource Group will be represented in WLM as a class.
Multiple instances of an application within a single resource group
shall be represented in WLM as subclasses.
In order to configure WLM, the system administrator must first
define the resource groups names. Once
the resource group names have been defined, then a WLM class must be
defined using the resource group name as the WLM class name.
To define a new WLM class using smitty, start smitty using the "wlm"
fastpath.
smitty wlm
Select "Add a class" to define a new WLM class.
Workload Manager
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
Manage time-based configuration sets
Work on alternate configurations
Work on a set of Subclasses
Show current focus (Configuration, Class Set)
List all classes
Add a class
Change / Show Characteristics of a class
Remove a class
Class assignment rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Assign/Unassign processes to a class/subclass
Enter the resource group name as the WLM class name, and provide a
description of this WLM class. The Tier level will normally be 0 (zero)
unless there is a specific reason to change this. The "Resource Set
Inheritance" value will normally be set to "Yes".
The user and group values will be dependent upon the nature of the
resource group. It may be desirable to specify a non-root user and
group that is permitted to administer the WLM class and/or assign
processes to the class. This will have to be determined on a resource
group by resource group basis. If this information is unknown, default
to "root" for the user values and "system" for the group values.
General characteristics of a class
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
* Class name [egapdmx1]
Description [EGATE Production Database for Mt Xia, Instance 0]
Tier [0]
Resource Set
Inheritance [Yes]
User authorized to assign its processes to this class [oracle]
Group authorized to assign its processes to this class [dba]
User authorized to administrate this class [root]
(Superclass only)
Group authorized to administrate this class [system]
(Superclass only)
Localshm [No]
Class rules are used to determine which processes are assigned to
which WLM classes and the order of the rules is significant. The first
rule that matches is used to determine the WLM class assignment, so the
class rules should be ordered from highly specific to less specific.
To define WLM class rules using smitty, start smitty using the "wlm"
fastpath.
smitty wlm
Select "Class assignment rules" to define a new WLM class.
Workload Manager
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
Manage time-based configuration sets
Work on alternate configurations
Work on a set of Subclasses
Show current focus (Configuration, Class Set)
List all classes
Add a class
Change / Show Characteristics of a class
Remove a class
Class assignment rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Assign/Unassign processes to a class/subclass
Select "Class assignment rules" to define a new WLM class rule.
Class assignment rules
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
List all Rules
Create a new Rule
Change / Show Characteristics of a Rule
Delete a Rule
Attribute value groupings
In the following example, a rule is defined to assign all processes
owned by oracle or the group dba to the the WLM class "egapdmx1". Again the
order of the rules is important. The rules should be ranked in order of
highly specific, starting at 1, to less specific.
Create a new Rule
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
* Order of the rule [1]
* Class name [egapdmx1
* User [oracle]
* Group [dba]
Application [-]
Type [-]
Tag [-]
To define a new WLM subclass using smitty, start smitty using the "wlm"
fastpath.
smitty wlm
Select "Add a class" to define a new WLM subclass.
Workload Manager
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
Manage time-based configuration sets
Work on alternate configurations
Work on a set of Subclasses
Show current focus (Configuration, Class Set)
List all classes
Add a class
Change / Show Characteristics of a class
Remove a class
Class assignment rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Assign/Unassign processes to a class/subclass
When defining a subclass, again enter the resource group name,
followed by a period (.) followed by the name of the subclass to create.
The Tier level will normally be 1 (one) for a subclass, unless there is
a specific reason to change this. The "Resource Set Inheritance" value
will normally be set to "Yes".
The user and group values will be dependent upon the nature of the
resource group. It may be desirable to specify a non-root user and
group that is permitted to administer the WLM class and/or assign
processes to the class. This will have to be determined on a resource
group by resource group basis. If this information is unknown, default
to "root" for the user values and "system" for the group values.
General characteristics of a class
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
* Class name [egapdmx1.oracleex511]
Description [EGATE Production Database for Mt Xia, Instance 511]
Tier [1]
Resource Set
Inheritance [Yes]
User authorized to assign its processes to this class [oracle]
Group authorized to assign its processes to this class [dba]
User authorized to administrate this class [root]
(Superclass only)
Group authorized to administrate this class [system]
(Superclass only)
Localshm [No]
To define a class rule for a subclass requires an additional step.
First select a set of WLM subclasses to work on, then define the rule.
To define a rule for a WLM subclass using smitty, start smitty using the
"wlm" fastpath.
smitty wlm
Select "Work on a set of Subclasses" to select the subclass for which
to define a rule.
Workload Manager
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
Manage time-based configuration sets
Work on alternate configurations
Work on a set of Subclasses
Show current focus (Configuration, Class Set)
List all classes
Add a class
Change / Show Characteristics of a class
Remove a class
Class assignment rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Assign/Unassign processes to a class/subclass
Select the WLM class that contains the subclass for which the rule
will be defined, press enter, then return to the main WLM menu.
Select a Superclass or -
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
* Superclass name [egapdmx1]
Select "Class assignment rules" to define a new WLM subclass rule.
Workload Manager
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
Manage time-based configuration sets
Work on alternate configurations
Work on a set of Subclasses
Show current focus (Configuration, Class Set)
List all classes
Add a class
Change / Show Characteristics of a class
Remove a class
Class assignment rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Assign/Unassign processes to a class/subclass
Select "Class assignment rules" to define a new WLM subclass rule.
Class assignment rules
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
List all Rules
Create a new Rule
Change / Show Characteristics of a Rule
Delete a Rule
Attribute value groupings
In the following example, a rule is defined to assign all processes
owned by oracle or the group dba to the the WLM subclass
"egapdmx1.oracleex511". Again the order of the rules is important. The
rules should be ranked in order of highly specific, starting at 1, to
less specific.
Create a new Rule
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
* Order of the rule [1]
* Class name oracleex511
* User [oracle]
* Group [dba]
Application [-]
Type [-]
Tag [-]
After all classes, subclasses, and rules have been defined, start
WLM.
smitty wlm
Select "Work on a set of Subclasses" to select the subclass for which
to define a rule.
Workload Manager
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
Manage time-based configuration sets
Work on alternate configurations
Work on a set of Subclasses
Show current focus (Configuration, Class Set)
List all classes
Add a class
Change / Show Characteristics of a class
Remove a class
Class assignment rules
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Assign/Unassign processes to a class/subclass
Select "Start Workload Manager"
Start/Stop/Update WLM
Move cursor to desired item and press Enter.
Start Workload Manager
Update Workload Manager
Stop Workload Manager
Show WLM status
For the options on this page, select the "current" configuration set,
choose the "Passive" management mode, and choose "Both" for the start
option.
Start Workload Manager
Type or select values in entry fields.
Press Enter AFTER making all desired changes.
[Entry Fields]
* Configuration, or for a set: set name/currently current
applicable configuration
Management mode Passive
Enforce Resource Set bindings Yes
Disable class total limits on resource usage Yes
Disable process total limits on resource usage Yes
Start now, at next boot, or both ? Both
Any subsequent changes to the WLM configuration will require that WLM
be stopped and restarted in order for the changes to take effect.
An example WLM configuration of the EGATE Production Database server
for Mt Xia follows. The "standard" WLM configuration for this machine
contains a single WLM class called "egapdmx1". It is important to
recognize that the "standard" WLM configuration will be different for
every machine. The term "standard" is used in reference to the local
machine, this is not enterprise wide terminology used here.
- bosapega01:/etc/wlm/standard/classes
-
System:
Default:
Shared:
egapdmx1:
description = "Oracle Concurrent"
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
adminuser = "root"
admingroup = "system"
The class rules associated with this "standard" configuration assign
any processes owned by "oracle" or by the group "dba" to the WLM class
"egapdmx1". All processes owned by "root" are assigned to the class
"System", and all other processes are assigned to the class
"Default".
- bosapega01:/etc/wlm/standard/rules
-
*class resvd user group application type tag
egapdmx1 - oracle dba - - -
System - root - - - -
Default - - - - - -
Multiple subclasses are defined for the class "egapdmx1". These
subclasses are intended to segment the processes by oracle instance.
The definition of subclasses will be customized for each individual
resource group.
- bosapega01:/etc/wlm/standard/egapdmx1/classes
-
Default:
Shared:
oracleex011:
description = "Instance ex011"
tier = 1
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
oracleex061:
description = "Instance ex061"
tier = 1
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
oracleex071:
description = "Instance ex071"
tier = 1
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
oracleexa11:
description = "Instance a11"
tier = 1
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
oracleex031:
description = "Instance ex031"
tier = 1
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
oracleex041:
description = "Instance ex041"
tier = 1
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
oracleex051:
description = "Instance ex051"
tier = 1
inheritance = "yes"
authuser = "oracle"
authgroup = "dba"
The rules associated with each subclass of the class "egapdmx1"
associate all processes owned by "oracle" or the group "dba" to the
subclass. In this instance the processes are not automatically assigned
to subclasses by WLM, instead they are assigned by the oracle startup
script.
- bosapega01:/etc/wlm/standard/egapdmx1/rules
-
*class resvd user group application type tag
oracleex011 - oracle - - - -
oracleex031 - oracle - - - -
oracleex041 - oracle - - - -
oracleex051 - oracle - - - -
oracleex061 - oracle - - - -
oracleex071 - oracle - - - -
oracleexa11 - oracle - - - -
Table of Contents
Standards - VG Name
Volume Group Name Standards
This document describes the standards for assigning AIX Volume
Group (VG) names. A single standard has been developed for use in
standalone, High Availability, and Disaster Recovery environments. This
VG naming standard provides the mechanism to assign enterprise wide
unique names to all AIX VG's and will eliminate naming conflicts in the
event of a manual or automated failover, or if multiple instances of an
application are running on a single server.
To assign enterprise wide unique VG names, the system administrator
must first define the resource groups
names. Once the resource group names have been defined, then a VG
name may be defined based on the resource group name.
A single system may contain multiple resource groups, and typically
there will be one VG defined per resource group. However, a resource
group may contain several VG's, depending upon the requirements of the
application.
To define a VG name, obtain the 8 character
resource group name, then add a 2 digit volume group sequence number
that will uniquely identify the VG, followed by the characters "vg".
The VG name will always end with the characters "vg".
The VG name shall consist of exactly 12 characters
with the following structure:
ApplicationCode + Environment + Function + Company + Sequence ID + VG Sequence ID + "vg"
3 char + 1 char + 1 char + 2 char + 1 char + 2 char + 2 char
As an example, a resource group named "egaapmx0", may have multiple
associated VG's:
RG Name
Component
|
VG Sequence
Identifier
|
LV Identifier
|
VG Name
|
egaapmx0
|
00
|
vg
|
egaapmx000vg
|
egaapmx0
|
01
|
vg
|
egaapmx001vg
|
egaapmx0
|
02
|
vg
|
egaapmx002vg
|
Each VG also requires a system or cluster wide unique Major Number.
A unique major number can be generated using the following
algorithm:
MajorNbr=$( print "${VGNAME}" | sum -o | awk '{ print $1 }' )
To reiterate, before creating a VG, first establish an enterprise
wide unique resource group name, a VG name,
and a major number. Then create the VG.
Table of Contents
Standards - LV Name
Logical Volume Name Standards
This document describes the standards for assigning AIX Logical
Volume (LV) names. A single standard has been developed for use in
standalone, High Availability, and Disaster Recovery environments. This
LV naming standard provides the mechanism to assign enterprise wide
unique names to all AIX LV's and will eliminate naming conflicts in the
event of a manual or automated failover, or if multiple instances of an
application are running on a single server.
To assign enterprise wide unique LV names, the system administrator
must first define the resource groups
names. Once the resource group names have been defined, then a
Volume Group (VG) must be defined based on the RG name. After the VG
has been created, LV's can be assigned. A VG will typically contain
several LV's, and each LV will be named based on the resource group to
which it is associated.
To define a LV name, obtain the 8 character
resource group name, then add a 4 digit logical volume sequence
identifier that will uniquely identify the LV, followed by the
characters "lv". The 4 digit LV sequence identifier will consist of
alpha-numeric characters and must always be exactly 4 characters in
length. The LV name will always end with the characters "lv".
The LV name shall consist of exactly 14 characters
with the following structure:
ApplicationCode + Environment + Function + Company + Sequence ID + LV Sequence ID + "lv"
3 char + 1 char + 1 char + 2 char + 1 char + 4 char + 2 char
As an example, a resource group named "egaapmx0", may have a volume
group named "egaapmx00vg". This volume group may have multiple LV's
associated with it:
RG Name
Component
|
LV Sequence
Identifier
|
LV Identifier
|
LV Name
|
egaapmx0
|
db20
|
lv
|
egaapmx0db20lv
|
egaapmx0
|
db21
|
lv
|
egaapmx0db21lv
|
egaapmx0
|
db22
|
lv
|
egaapmx0db22lv
|
JFS filesystems will require a logical volume for the JFS log. This
must also have an enterprise wide unique name.
JFS Log Logical Volume Name Standards
The following is a description of the standards for assigning AIX JFS
Log Logical Volume (JFS Log LV) names. A single standard has been
developed for use in standalone, High Availability, and Disaster
Recovery environments. This JFS Log LV naming standard provides the
mechanism to assign enterprise wide unique names to all AIX JFS Log LV's
and will eliminate naming conflicts in the event of a manual or
automated failover, or if multiple instances of an application are
running on a single server.
To assign enterprise wide unique JFS Log LV names, the system
administrator must first define the resource
groups names. Once the resource group names have been defined, then
a Volume Group (VG) must be defined based on the RG name. After the VG
has been created, JFS Log LV's can be assigned. A VG will typically
contain one JFS Log LV's, however multiple JFS Log LV's can exist.
To define a JFS Log LV name, obtain the 8
character resource group name, then add the 4 digit logical volume
sequence identifier that will uniquely identify the JFS Log LV, followed
by the characters "lv". The 4 digit JFS Log LV sequence identifier will
consist of the characters "jfs" followed by a single digit to uniquely
identify the JFS Log LV. The JFS Log LV name will always end with the
characters "lv".
The JFS Log LV name shall consist of exactly 14 characters
with the following structure:
ApplicationCode + Environment + Function + Company + Sequence ID + "jfs" + JFS Log Sequence ID + "lv"
3 char + 1 char + 1 char + 2 char + 1 char + 3 char + 1 char + 2 char
As an example, a resource group named "egaapmx0", may have a volume
group named "egaapmx00vg". This volume group may have multiple JFS Log LV's
associated with it:
RG Name
Component
|
JFS Log LV
Sequence ID
|
JFS Log
LV ID
|
JFS Log
LV Name
|
egaapmx0
|
jfs0
|
lv
|
egaapmx0jfs0lv
|
egaapmx0
|
jfs1
|
lv
|
egaapmx0jfs1lv
|
egaapmx0
|
jfs2
|
lv
|
egaapmx0jfs2lv
|
JFS filesystems will require a logical volume for the JFS log. This
must also have an enterprise wide unique name.
Table of Contents
Standards - JFS Logs
JFS Log Logical Volume Name Standards
The following is a description of the standards for assigning AIX JFS
Log Logical Volume (JFS Log LV) names. A single standard has been
developed for use in standalone, High Availability, and Disaster
Recovery environments. This JFS Log LV naming standard provides the
mechanism to assign enterprise wide unique names to all AIX JFS Log LV's
and will eliminate naming conflicts in the event of a manual or
automated failover, or if multiple instances of an application are
running on a single server.
To assign enterprise wide unique JFS Log LV names, the system
administrator must first define the resource
groups names. Once the resource group names have been defined, then
a Volume Group (VG) must be defined based on the RG name. After the VG
has been created, JFS Log LV's can be assigned. A VG will typically
contain one JFS Log LV's, however multiple JFS Log LV's can exist.
To define a JFS Log LV name, obtain the 8
character resource group name, then add the 4 digit logical volume
sequence identifier that will uniquely identify the JFS Log LV, followed
by the characters "lv". The 4 digit JFS Log LV sequence identifier will
consist of the characters "jfs" followed by a single digit to uniquely
identify the JFS Log LV. The JFS Log LV name will always end with the
characters "lv".
The JFS Log LV name shall consist of exactly 14 characters
with the following structure:
ApplicationCode + Environment + Function + Company + Sequence ID + "jfs" + JFS Log Sequence ID + "lv"
3 char + 1 char + 1 char + 2 char + 1 char + 3 char + 1 char + 2 char
As an example, a resource group named "egaapmx0", may have a volume
group named "egaapmx00vg". This volume group may have multiple JFS Log LV's
associated with it:
RG Name
Component
|
JFS Log LV
Sequence ID
|
JFS Log
LV ID
|
JFS Log
LV Name
|
egaapmx0
|
jfs0
|
lv
|
egaapmx0jfs0lv
|
egaapmx0
|
jfs1
|
lv
|
egaapmx0jfs1lv
|
egaapmx0
|
jfs2
|
lv
|
egaapmx0jfs2lv
|
JFS filesystems will require a logical volume for the JFS log. This
must also have an enterprise wide unique name.
Table of Contents
Standards - FS Mt Point
File System Mount Point Directory Name Standards
This document describes the standards for assigning AIX filesystem
mount point (MtPt) directory names. A single standard has been developed
for use in standalone, High Availability, and Disaster Recovery
environments. This filesystem mount point directory naming standard
provides the mechanism to assign enterprise wide unique names to all AIX
filesystem mount point directory's and will eliminate naming conflicts
in the event of a manual or automated failover, or if multiple instances
of an application are running on a single server.
To assign enterprise wide unique LV names, the system administrator
must first define the Resource Groups,
Volume Groups, and
Logical Volumes. Once these have been defined, the filesystem mount
point directory names can be assigned. Typically a filesystem mount
point is required for each logical volume, therefore the mount point can
usually be based on the logical volume name, or at a minimum the
resource group name.
To define a filesystem mount point directory name, obtain the 8 character resource group name, then
depending upon the applications filesystem requirements, use the RG name
as the mount point, or add sub-directories to make it enterprise wide
unique.
The filesystem mount point directory name shall consist of at least
8 characters, but may be of a variable length:
/ + ApplicationCode + Environment + Function + Company + Sequence ID + ( LV Sequence ID or Directory Structure )
3 char + 1 char + 1 char + 2 char + 1 char + 4 or more char
As an example, a resource group named "egaapmx0", may have multiple
file systems associated with it:
RG Name
Component
|
Optional
Logical Volume
Sequence ID
|
Optional
Sub-Directories
|
Filesystem
Mount Point
|
egaapmx0
|
|
db2_08_01/bin
|
/egaapmx0/db2_08_01/bin
|
egaapmx0
|
|
db2_08_01/data
|
/egaapmx0/db2_08_01/data
|
egaapmx1
|
mq01
|
|
/egaapmx1mq01
|
egaapmx1
|
mq02
|
|
/egaapmx1mq02
|
egaapmx1
|
mq03
|
|
/egaapmx1mq03
|
Table of Contents
Standards - User/UID
User Name Standards
This document describes the standards for assigning user names and
UID numbers in Mt Xia's AIX environment. A single standard has been
developed for use in standalone, High Availability, and Disaster
Recovery environments. This user naming standard provides the mechanism
to assign enterprise wide unique user names to all AIX users's and will
eliminate naming conflicts in the event of a manual or automated
failover, or if multiple instances of an application are running on a
single server.
Users are normally divided into two major categories on a Unix
system, administrators and normal users. Applications such as
databases, SAP, MQSeries, etc normally require an administration user
name and possibly a group name. With each new user created on a Unix
system a user ID number is assigned to that user, this user ID number is
referred to as the UID number and is normally unique to that user on
that one Unix system. When building highly available and/or recoverable
systems, the user name and UID number must be enterprise wide unique
values. Therefore a centralized user management system must be
implemented to manage users and UID numbers to ensure that no two users
have the same user name or UID number.
This centralized user management function is performed in Mt Xia's
environment by LDAP. All user requests and assignments must be
performed through the centralized user management system via the LDAP
servers.
Table of Contents
Standards - Group/GID
Group Name Standards
This document describes the standards for assigning group names and
GID numbers in Mt Xia's AIX environment. A single standard has been
developed for use in standalone, High Availability, and Disaster
Recovery environments. This group naming standard provides the
mechanism to assign enterprise wide unique group names to all AIX
groups's and will eliminate naming conflicts in the event of a manual or
automated failover, or if multiple instances of an application are
running on a single server.
Groups are normally divided into two major categories on a Unix
system, administration and normal user groups. Applications such as
databases, SAP, MQSeries, etc may require an administration group. With
each new group created on a Unix system a group ID number is assigned to
that group, this group ID number is referred to as the GID number and is
normally unique to that group on that one Unix system. When building
highly available and/or recoverable systems, the group name and GID
number must be enterprise wide unique values. Therefore a centralized
group management system must be implemented to manage groups and GID
numbers to ensure that no two groups have the same group name or UID
number.
This centralized group management function is performed in Mt Xia's
environment by LDAP. All group requests and assignments must be
performed through the centralized group management system via the LDAP
servers.
Table of Contents
Standards - Security (DRAFT)
Security Standards - AIX, Solaris, Linux
1 General Security
Design
1.1
Environment
1.1.1
|
The root user's PATH variable does not include the Current
Working Directory or its parent.
|
If the root user's PATH includes '.' or '..', the user is
vulnerable to trojan horse attacks residing in the user's current working
directory or its parent.
|
The default path for the root user does not include any
directories which are writable by other users.
|
1.1.2
|
Any user's PATH variable does not include the Current
Working Directory unless it's the last entry in the PATH; any specific $HOME
directories must be after the standard system directories and before the
current directories in a user's PATH variable.
|
If a user's PATH includes '.' or '..', the user is
vulnerable to trojan horse attacks residing in the user's current working
directory or its parent.
|
The default path for any user should not include any
directories which are writable by themselves or other users until checking
for system supported commands first.
|
1.2
Network Services
1.2.1
|
Insecure Sendmail configuration options such as WIZ, VRFY,
EXPN and DEBUG are not used.
|
Several of the Sendmail commands present serious security
risks. For instance, the WIZ command allows anyone who knows the
"Wizard" password to log into the system, gaining command line access.
VRFY and EXPN ("verify" and "expand" respectively) allow
anyone to query the Sendmail server as to the names of valid accounts on the
system. DEBUG allows an outsider to put Sendmail in "debug" mode
and execute commands on the system.
|
A mail program such as smap should be used. Smap eliminates most of
the security weaknesses associated with sendmail.
|
1.2.2
|
The Sendmail daemon is only used if an approved business
justification exists.
|
The Sendmail program is the mail system's routing program.
The UNIX program /usr/lib/sendmail implements both the client and the server
side of the mail program. Sendmail has been the source of numerous security
breaches on UNIX systems. Security vulnerabilities have been found in all
versions of Sendmail, up to and including Sendmail version 8.11.2 This
is the latest version of Sendmail '
see www.sendmail.com
|
On AIX, sendmail is started by the Run Control (rc)
scripts. Locate the entry for
sendmail and comment it out.
In order for the changes to take effect, one must either
reboot or kill the currently running sendmail process.
|
1.2.3
|
The sendmail.cf file allows only a minimal list of "trusted
users."
|
The /etc/sendmail.cf file contains configuration
information necessary for sendmail to run, include options which can create
security vulnerabilities in the mail system. The T configuration command
identifies the "trusted users" who can override a sender's name in
a mail message by using the -f option with one of their own. Trusted users
are necessary for certain kinds of mail to flow properly, but other trust
relationships can be added which introduce security vulnerabilities.
|
Remove any T sendmail.cf directives not listing uucp, root
or daemon.
|
1.2.4
|
DNS is configured to disallow unauthorized zone transfers.
|
Zone transfers can be used by intruders to rapidly obtain
a complete map of an organization's servers. Such information is
commonly used by intruders to facilitate target
scanning and selection during break-in attempts.
|
DNS is configured to prevent unauthorized zone transfers
as well as log unauthorized zone transfer attempts.
|
1.2.5
|
If the WAN architecture allows access from insecure
networks such as the Internet, the server's network services are either
disabled or implemented in a manner which appropriately minimizes the risk of
intrusion from the insecure networks.
|
Many network services are unnecessary and may pose a
security risk if enabled on servers accessable via the Internet or high risk
WAN segments.
|
Only network services which are necessary for business
operations are active.
|
1.2.6
|
The latest available version of BIND is installed on the
system
|
Earlier versions of UNIX BIND contained security problems
which might allow an attacker to gain access to the system
|
The latest available version of BIND should be
installed. Currently
(01/17/2001/19/2000), the latest version is BIND 9.1. You can find
this information at www.isc.org.
|
1.2.7
|
The Sendmail Aliases file is configured securely.
|
An incorrectly configured /etc/aliases file may allow
unauthorized access to the system.
|
1) The aliases file must be owned by root and protected
mode 644. Use the following command
to check the file permissions:
ls -l /etc/aliases
They should read:
"-rw-r--r--"
If permissions are incorrect, change them using the
following command:
chmod 644 /etc/aliases
2) Review the entries in the aliases file, using vi
/etc/aliases, and comment out any undesirable entries (using a text editor,
place a comment "#" marker at the front of the line in question).
In particular:
a) Remove the decode alias, which might appear in the
alias file as follows:
decode: |/usr/bin/guudecode
b) Review for any other entries which execute a program.
Remove if not necessary.
If NIS is used, run /usr/sbin/newaliases after changing
the aliases file in order to rebuild the maps.
|
1.2.8
|
The Sendmail mail queue file is configured securely, with
the minimum permissions necessary for operation.
|
Access to the mail queue can allow users to read other
users mail, gaining sensitive information or to overwrite mail messages.
|
Check the mail
queue's permissions, by:
ls -l /var/spool/mqueue/mqueue
Since only the owner, root, should have access, the
permissions should look like:
-rwx------
If permissions are not correct, change them by:
chmod 700 /usr/spool/mqueue/mqueue
|
1.2.9
|
The sendmail.cf file has secure file permissions.
|
If the Sendmail configuration file has improper file
permissions (e.g., world writeable) there is an increased risk than an
unauthorized user may gain privileged access to the system or cause a
disruption of service.
|
The sendmail.cf file should be secured with appropriate
file permissions. The
/etc/sendmail.cf file must be writable only by root with permission mode 640
or 660.
|
1.2.10
|
Sendmail is implemented in a secure manner, including
immediate installation of the latest security patches as they become
available.
|
Sendmail (a mail routing daemon) has been the source of
numerous security breaches on UNIX systems. Security vulnerabilities
have been found in all versions of Sendmail,
up to and including Sendmail version 8.8.11.2 (Sendmail is currently on
version 8.11.2 as of 12/29/2000 . You
can find this information at www.sendmail.com.
|
Check www.ers.ibm.com for the latest patches; follow site
instructions to install patch. Subscribe to the IBM ERS service to keep
abreast of latest patches to install, as well as the CERT (www.cert.org) and
Bugtraq (www.netspace.org) mailing lists for breaking news regarding Sendmail
(and other) security vulnerabilities. In addition, the latest
information on sendmail can be found at
www.sendmail.org.
Evaluate the need to run sendmail, and disable if the
service is not used. If sendmail is
necessary, conisder using a more secure version (e.g, Qmail) or a sendmail
wrapper (smrsh, SMAP / SMAPD).
|
1.2.11
|
Unnecessary RPC services are disabled.
|
RPC services provide unauthenticated or weakly
authenticated access to systems to remotely execute commands (Remote
Procedure Calls) for distributed computing. RPC is used for services such as
NFS, but can be a significant vulnerability source.
|
Where RPC is necessary, secure versions of RPC which
implement strong authentication and encryption are used.
|
1.2.12
|
Protect against an account name/password guessing attack
|
Parameters in the /etc/security/login.cfg
file can be set by port to delay or prohibit additional logins after a failed
login.
|
Consider setting the parameters appropriately to protect
against a guessing attack on sensitive ports (i.e. a modem port).
Examine failed logins using
/usr/bin/who `-s` `/etc/security/failedlogin`
|
1.2.13
|
The organizational structure of the IS and security groups
provides for adequate UNIX security.
|
I think you wanted to say IS personnel resources are
insufficient to allow for the time and effort needed to address security
issues, security needs are generally assigned a very low priority.
|
Sufficient lets either use IS or MIS not both when talking about
the same function.MIS
resources should be devoted to security. Job descriptions of system,
network and database administrators should
include security related tasks.
|
1.3
Network Information Services (NIS/NIS+)
1.3.1
|
(If NIS is used) a current (i.e., patched) version of NIS
is implemented for enterprise wide user authentication.
|
NIS offer a robust set of administration options that
organizations can use centrally manage access to system resources.
However, there are many options that need
to be configured correctly to provide security over the NIS
environment. Moreover, many security related
vulnerabilities have been associated with NIS. Thus, if NIS is not
properly configured and patched, there is
an increased risk an unauthorized user could gain privileged access to system
resources.
|
Contact your vendor for the most up-to-date patches for
NIS/NIS+.
To check for active NIS, use:
isypset=`domainname | /bin/grep '^[a-zA-Z]'
If active, to check the NIS domainname, use:
/usr/bin/domainname
|
1.3.2
|
If NIS is used, it only provides users with access to
those systems they have a business need to access.
|
Users with domain-wide access may have privileges which go
beyond their job responsibilities, including unauthorized access to sensitive
files.
|
Limited access via NIS can be accomplished by creating one
or more designated login shells on each machine.
For instance, the server sales may contain the login
shells /usr/local/salessh and /usr/local/salesapp, the former being a copy of
/bin/sh and the latter being a shell which launches an application on this
server.
Most users will now have the NIS entry
/usr/local/salesapp, while users requiring shell access to the server will
have the NIS entry /usr/local/salessh. These users can now be
administered on a domain-wide basis, but their
login access is limited to the server sales.
Note also that the .login/.cshrc/.profile files can play a
role in controlling NIS access.
|
1.3.3
|
NIS configuration files have secure file permissions.
|
World-writable NIS configuration files could make it
possible for an attacker to change NIS information, including adding
privileged accounts.
|
NIS configuration files have restrictive permissions. In
particular, the passwd.adjunct file is
not accessible by users other than root.
The umask value for the root user is set to 077 to ensure
that files are created with secure default permissions.
|
1.3.4
|
NIS Master servers do not use NIS for password
information.
|
Since NIS master servers are key to NIS security, and thus
a point of compromise for the entire network, such systems should have extra
security protections
|
NIS master servers use only local account information for
authentication.
|
1.3.5
|
Root level UIDs are only defined on the local server and
do not provide domain-wide access through the NIS password file.
|
If root IDs are implemented domain-wide using NIS, it is
likely that system administrators will have privileged access to systems not
required for their job functions, while the compromise of a single root
account would result in the compromise of all systems in the domain.
|
NIS contains no root level UIDs (uid=0).
|
1.4 System Configuration
1.4.1
|
|
The at command allow users to run commands at a later
time, using the cron command queue. The unrestricted use of these
commands is a security risk.
|
Review the at.allow and at.deny files for appropriate
entries, using the cat command. If users other than root have a business need
to use the at and batch commands, create the at.allow and at.deny files to
control which users can use the at command. The login names of users that are
allowed to use the at command must be listed in the at.allow file. The
at.deny file specifies the list of denied users.
These files must be owned by root and members of the sys
group, with permissions mode 640.
Where necessary, add entries to at.allow and at.deny using
a text editor, and change permissions
on these files using chmod.
|
1.4.2
|
Devices (except terminals) are not world readable,
writeable or executable.
|
Improperly protected devices (which are represented to the
UNIX OS as files) can leave systems vulnerable to attackers. For instance, if
an attacker can write to the /dev/kmem device (kernel memory) with a
debugger, he may be able to modify his UserID (to become root), modify data
in system buffers, or write garbage over critical data structures, causing
the system to crash. Similarly, unauthorized access to disk devices, tape
devices, network devices and terminals being used by others can lead to
problems.
|
Use the chmod command to set appropriate permissions on
device files.
|
1.4.3
|
The network interface card should not be in promiscuous
mode.
|
Most Ethernet cards can be placed in
"promiscuous" mode, which enables a user to gather and review all
Ethernet packets on the local subnetwork, including the data in those
packets, such as passwords. Intruders will often attempt to install such
gathering software (such as etherfind or tcpdump) upon breaking into the
system, in order to gain further access.
|
To determine whether the network interface is in
promiscuous mode, use the CPM tools, available from www.cert.org
|
1.4.4
|
Use of the mount command should not be executable
by users and any untrusted file system (i.e. CD-ROMS) should only be mounted
without the ability to execute suid programs.
|
Users can inadvertantly mount systems over one another and
do not need to routinely mount file susyems. A file system mounted, such as a
CD-ROM may contain suid to root programs, allowing an attacker to gain root
access.
|
Remove the mount
command from world access and require untrusted file systems to be mounted
with the 'o nosuid option.
|
1.5 Support, Maintenance &
Planning
1.5.1
|
Corporate IS security policies include specific sections
pertaining to the UNIX environment, including configuration guidelines to
significant security areas.
|
AIX System Administrator that does not know and understand
the Corporate IS security policies may wrongly configure the AIX system and
thereby expose the system to security risks.
|
Review the corporate information security policies and
procedures to determine if sufficient support exists for a controlled
environment. UNIX policies should include specific configuration guidelines,
tailored to particular environments such as "file servers,"
"DMZ systems," etc.
|
1.5.2
|
Procedures must be implemented for the regular acquisition
and installation of vendor (both IBM and third party applications) patches
and upgrades necessary to correct security flaws, as well as installation of
workarounds for unpatched problems.
|
The system may be needlessly vulnerable to security flaws
discovered on an ongoing basis, in terms of both system penetration and
denial of service. System crackers are aware of security flaws, and will
exploit them if patches are not implemented.
|
Inquire about the system administrator's procedures for
obtaining the latest and Inquire about the system administrator's procedures
for obtaining the latest and installing the security patches and workarounds.
Review vendor resources (including www.ers.ibm.com)
and security sites such as CERT
(www.cert.org) and Bugtraq (www.netspace.org) for the existence of
security-related system patches for the particular OS, and install said
patches. If using an older version of the OS, upgrading to the latest version
of the OS (plus any patches for that version is usually preferable to keeping
the older version with patches. The IBM ERS web site contains (but not
for any other software such as a
third party Web server or for Sendmail - consult other vendors as
appropriate.
Important: Some patches may change to your system
configuration to insecure defaults.installing the security patches and
workarounds.
Review vendor resources (including www.ers.ibm.com)
and security sites such as CERT
(www.cert.org) and Bugtraq (www.netspace.org) for the existence of
security-related system patches for the particular OS, and install said patches
Important: Some patches may change to your system
configuration to insecure defaults.
|
1.5.3
|
If significant programming is done on the server, an
appropriate system development life cycle and change control methodology is
in place.
|
A disorderly development environment, including problems such
as a blurring of the development and production environments, insufficient
quality assurance testing, insufficient documentation, and excessive
programmer privileges, can lead to a breakdown in the security of the system
and the integrity of the production data.
|
Develop applications on a development system. (NOTE:
Development system needs to be completely separate from Production system and
network).
Test new application/program on the Development/Test
system. Provide the test criteria and application/program documentation.
Submit program to Quality & Assurance group for
testing.
Develop a migration plan to the Production system.
Prepare a back-out plan.
Notify the system administrator about the migration
and the tentative date.
If all tests have been conducted and passed, submit a
change request following the Change Management Process.
If all authorizations have been obtained and the date
approved, migrate to production according to plan.
Verify that the migrated application is working.
Provide any required maintenance documentation to the
system administrator.
|
1.6 Physical Access
1.6.1
|
The server's physical surroundings are designed for the
safety and availability of the system, including cleanliness (lack of
dust), appropriate and stable temperature
and humidity, and neat and controlled cabling.
|
If a computer is not stored in a clean, cool environment,
it may be subject to more breakdowns and loss of data.
|
Rooms containing critical servers should be
climate-controlled.
If conditions are inappropriate, take steps to correct.
|
2 Identification
2.1
User Accounts
2.1.1
|
Each user has a unique user name and user ID.
|
UNIX tracks users by UID, rather than by username.
Therefore, where users share UIDs, they may gain access to each others'
files, while security administrators will not be able to track
specific security events to specific users.
|
All server user names and UIDs are unique.
The process for user addition and deletion is constructed
so as to minimize the risk of duplicate user names and UIDs.
|
2.1.2
|
User account group identification (GID) codes should be
greater than 100 and never be 1 or 0. User account UIDs should be
greater than 100 and must never be 0.
|
UNIX UIDs under 100 are reserved for system accounts. By allowing
users to have UIDs under 100,
the risk is increased that the user will have access to information or
resources that are reserved for more powerful system level accounts.
|
To change a user's UID or GID, use the smit tool. Next, use the
chmod command to change
ownership any files owned by the old UID to the new UID.
|
2.1.3
|
User names follow an organizational naming convention.
|
Following a pre-defined set of standards allows for the
easier recognition of new accounts that may have been created in
violation of policy, either by
intruders or system administrators.
|
Best Practices call for a naming standard which makes it
hard for outsiders to guess individual account names based on personal
information.
We have a namiming standard in the Account Management and
MSB Introduction documents. You may
want to reference these two documents here.
This naming standard prevents outsiders' deriving user account
names from
publically available information such as employee names. User account
names can be used in
combination with password guessing and social engineering to gain
unauthorized access to systems.
|
2.1.4
|
Generic or group user accounts are not used. A generic account is
identified as a user
account in which multiple users, on a regular basis, access and have
knowledge of a single user account
with a known identification/password combination.
|
Generic user accounts limit accountability on user actions
performed while logged in as a generic user. Use of a generic account are
extremely difficult to audit since it is impossible differentiate between the
activities of individual users, making it a high priority target for
intruders.
|
If a generic account is identified, perform the following:
1. Identify the
purpose of the account,
2. Identify all
users of the account,
3. Create unique
accounts for all users of the generic account,
4. Assign
appropriate rights to all new user accounts, and
5. Delete the
generic account.
|
2.1.5
|
Third party tech support accounts are disabled, and only
enabled temporarily as needed.
|
Vendor accounts are often left enabled, with default
passwords shared among vendor employees and known to vendor ex-employees.
|
Vendor support accounts should only be enabled on a
temporary basis.
Support contracts with third-party vendors should be
reviewed to determine liability in case a break-in takes place through the
vendor's network.
The third-party vendor should be contacted to determine
whether secure systems practices are being followed, whether third-party
security reviews have been performed, and whether such reviews are available
for inspection.
|
2.2
System Configuration
2.2.1
|
Default system accounts that do not need to be used are
disabled.
|
Default system accounts, such as daemon, bin, sys and
adm, are automatically created when
the AIX Operating System is installed. Many of these accounts are never
logged into but are instead place holders for software ownership.
|
The following accounts provided by default with AIX 4.x
should be disabled:
daemon, bin, sys, adm, uucp, guest, nobody, lpd.
|
2.2.1
|
All user accounts should be managed consistently to
minimize inappropriate account configurations.
|
Managing user accounts and their associated parameters by
editing the native unix files, or even the mkuser command can lead to
misconfiguartions creating a security exposure.
|
Use the smit utility whenever its capabilitiy is
sufficient. All normal administration of user accounts should utilize the
smit utility.
|
3
Authentication
3.1 User
Accounts
3.1.1
|
Accounts that run a single command, without
authentication, are not allowed.
|
UNIX allows accounts that simply run a single command or
application program (rather than a shell) at login. These accounts typically
have no password and are used, for example, to allow people to log in as who
to obtain a list of who is on the system, to log in as lpq to check the
printer queue, and so on. Examples of such accounts include who, finger, lpq,
mail, news, date, uptime, sync, and help. These types of accounts are often
exploited by an intruder.
|
Delete any unauthenticated single command logins using the
smit tool.
|
3.1.2
|
Dormant accounts are removed or disabled.
|
Dormant entries are a target for intruders, as the account
user will not notice the activity.
|
Procedures should be in place for checking for dormant
accounts on a regular basis. Same comment
as 2.4.1.
|
|
|
|
|
3.2 Password
Composition & Management
3.2.1
|
Passwords are not easily guessable, i.e. words found in a
dictionary, or a variation on the user name; they do not pertain directly to
a user's family or personal interests. While passwords should contain both
alpha and numeric characters, passwords with special characters are even
harder to guess or crack with a utility.
|
Passwords which are easy to guess give intruders an easy
opportunity to break into the system.
|
Define password/user characteristics in
/etc/security/user, /etc/security/mkuser.default, /etc/security/login.cfg
Minimum requirements (defined in /etc/security/user):
minlen=8
maxage=12
minage=1
maxrepeat=2
minalpha=5
minother=3
mindiff=3
maxrepeats=2
maxexpired=0
histsize=24
pwdwarntime=14
Set dictionlist=
dictionary file of invalid passwords
Set minimum default values for smit user field (defined in
/etc/security/user) for the default stanza as follows:
admin=false
login=true
su=false
daemon=true
rlogin=false
sugroups=ALL
ttys=ALL
auth1=SYSTEM
auth2=NONE
tpath=noask
umask=027
expire=0
|
3.2.2
|
A unique initial password must be assigned to all new
accounts and all users must change their passwords immediately when using a
new account for the first time and passwords are distributed in a secure
manner.
|
If passwords are distributed in printed format or by
e-mail, the likelihood is greatly increased that the information will fall
into the hands of intruders, who can intercept e-mail or regularly
check the office printer for password lists.
|
Initial system passwords should be created in a secure
manner, for instance by using a random character generator. Users
should be required to obtain their
initial system password in person and instructed to destroy any written
material which may contain their password. We have a clearly defined
process for new user password creation and
communication in our Account Management Policy and MSB Introduction.
We need to either reference these two
documents or write the appropriate guidelines.
|
3.2.3
|
Root passwords should be different for each machine.
|
Using the same root password on all machines can lead to
compromise of all machines with the compromise of just one.
|
The root password is set differently on each machine. The
frequency with which they are changed should be irregular and unpredictable.
|
3.2.4
|
The root account does not allow for the separation of
duties.
|
Separation of duties is basic to security controls. The
root account is all-powerful; access to this account for a subset of
privileges violates this concept.
|
Utilize the Administrative Roles feature to achieve
greater separation of duties and to reduce the number of personnel requiring
the root account access.
|
3.2.5
|
The shadow password file is used, with appropriate file
permissions.
|
The standard UNIX password file is world readable, so that
anyone logged into the system can read the file and attempt to crack the
account passwords, including root. The shadow password file removes this
threat by moving the password information to a separate file, readable only
by root. If the shadow password file is accessible by other users, the value
of the shadow file is lost.
|
Password shadowing should be in use for every account on
the system. No encrypted passwords should exist in the etc/passwd file (null, * and ! only in the password field).
|
3.2.6
|
Insure proper password maintenance.
|
Improperly maintained passwords can result in
explotitation of the system and reduce user accountability.
|
To scan for password inconsistencies, use:
/usr/bin/pwdck ?n ALL
To scan for group inconsistencies, use:
/usr/bin/grpck ?n ALL
Both of these will report errors but will not fix
them automatically. To have the
errors fixed, change the '-n' to '-y' in both cases.
Review /etc/passwd, /etc/security/passwd,
/etc/security/group regularly for changes
|
3.3
System Configuration
3.3.1
|
Only one root level account (UID = 0) is defined on the
server.
|
Multiple root level accounts increase the risk that users
have system access privileges not required for their job functions. In
addition, intruders who target
privileged accounts have multiple opportunities to gain root access.
It also becomes more difficult to maintain
an accurate audit trail when more than one root-level user exists on the
system.
|
Only one account with UID=0 exists on the system.
Administrators are required to log into their own
unprivileged accounts and su to root. No direct logins to the system
as root are allowed.
Administrators are to never su to root from a user's
session without resetting the path variable or entering the full path for
each command.
|
4 System Access
Controls
4.1 User Accounts
4.1.1
|
Employee accounts are removed in a timely manner after
separation from employment.
|
Unnecessary accounts or accounts with unnecessary
privileges create additional access paths for intruders.
|
Business processes should be in place which ensure that
all organizational accounts are created, updated and deleted in a timely
manner.
Often, and particularly in large orgainzations, software
to support the above processes must be acquired.
|
4.1.2
|
End users are not provided command line (shell) access to
the UNIX operating system unless necessary for their job functions.
|
Access to the command line via a shell (the command line
interpreter) increases the risk that the user can access unauthorized
resources, as well as the risk to the system if an account is compromised.
|
The following methods, in order of effectiveness,
represent best practices:
1) Replace the shell located in the last field of the
password file (cat /etc/passwd). with a menu program,
2) Use the chroot command to prevent user from accessing
unauthorized files,
3) Give users a restricted shell with no access to cd, rm,
cat, and other sensitive commands (historical implementations of restricted
shells have often been found to be ineffective).
Note that restricting the shell is ineffective unless the
rshd daemon is disabled on the server.
|
4.1.3
|
User configurable environment files should only be
changeable by the user or root.
|
Only the user should have write access to these files and
no other users need to be able to see them.
|
Group and world require no access privilieges to the
following files:
$HOME./.profile
$HOME./cshrc.
$HOME./.Xdefaults
|
4.1.4
|
The umask is set to control access to newly created
files. Only the owner of a file has
default permissions to read, write and execute the newly created
file.
|
Files and directories are created with a default set of
permissions; these default permissions are controlled by the umask (user
mask) system variable. Often, the default permissions are far in excess of
what is needed for job functions, such as default world read and write
privileges, creating opportunities for access to sensitive files or
compromise of other accounts including root.
|
The umask setting should be one of:
077 - Most restrictive, but may hinder some collaborative
efforts. Only the user has any access
to the files he/she creates.
027 - Somewhat less restrictive. Allows others in the user's group
to read files created by the
user.
022 - Less restrictive. Allows any user to read files created by
the user.
The umask value must be set in the system file
/etc/default/login.
User umasks are set in the /etc/profile file (for Bourne
and Korn shell users) and in the .login or .cshrc files in the user's home
directory.
For files deemed sensitive or confidential, use ACLs to
further refine file access permissions.
|
4.1.5
|
Employee accounts are removed in a timely manner after
separation from employment.
|
Unnecessary accounts or accounts with unnecessary privileges
create additional access paths for intruders.
|
Business processes should be in place which ensure that
all organizational accounts are created, updated and deleted in a timely
manner.
Often, and particularly in large orgainzations, software
to support the above processes must be acquired.
|
4.2 System
Configuration
4.2.1
|
Any ' r ' services such as rlogin, rsh, rexec and .rhosts
files are disabled.
|
By using .rhosts authentication on a server, a user can
permit specified users on specified machines to log in to the server without
entering a password. Thus, individual
users can set security policy (without the system administrator's knowledge),
potentially leading to loss of critical resources within that account, and
potentially compromising the entire host.
|
Run the securetcpip command to disable the 'r' commands
and deamons
A cron job should be established to periodically check
for, and remove, all 'r' commands such as rlogin, rsh, rexec, rcp and .rhosts
files. This can be accomplished
manually by issuing the following command:
find / \(-name .rhosts -o -name .netrc \) -print
Remove any 'r' files that are not required (rm
<filename>).
If 'r' files are required, utilize a utility such as
Tripwire to verify that the files are not modified.
Where .rhosts files are permitted, they should be limited
to those users with a need for UNIX r-services. This can be
accomplished on a per-user basis by editing the
'rlogin=no' parameter in /etc/security/user.
.rhosts files may be effectively monitored by including
them in the AIX Trusted Computing Base.
|
4.2.2
|
All user shells are listed in the /etc/shells file.
|
The program chsh uses /etc/shells to determine which files
are valid shells when the user wishes to change their shell. A user may be
able to use any file as a shell if /etc/shells does not exist.
|
The /etc/shells file exists and contains the names of a
small number of valid shells.
|
4.2.3
|
Data files are given only the minimum access permissions
necessary for operation.
|
World writeable data files can be changed by anyone having
any access to the system. Even without malicious intent, an inexperienced
user may accidentally make critical changes to sensitive data files, or
inadvertently allow an intruder to gain unauthorized access.
|
Obtain a list of world readable and writeable files and
directories by:
find / \(-perm
-0004 -o -perm -0002 \) -print
>> ey.ww
This command will search the file system for world
readable and writeable files and send the contents to a local text file
called "ey.ww".
Note: exact command syntax may vary from system to system.
Consult the system's man page. Also, this file may have already been created
in a previous review step.
Review the list for appropriateness.
Change file permissions as necessary using chmod.
|
4.2.4
|
UNIX executables (e.g. /bin/sh and /usr/sbin/netstat),
shell scripts (e.g. the /etc/rc scripts) and configuration files (e.g.
/etc/inittab, /etc/inetd.conf, .profile and .login) are given only the
minimum privileges necessary for operation.
|
World writeable binaries and shell scripts can be changed
or replaced with command files to
give the intruder further access, or to damage the system (a.k.a. a
"Trojan horse"). In any event, inexperienced users may accidentally
damage the system or make hard to trace bugs due to critical files.
|
Executables and shell scripts generally should not be
world writeable, e.g., those in /bin, /usr/sbin, /dev, (although some
devices may need to be world
writeable), /etc, /etc/conf, /etc/default, /etc/init.d, /etc/log, /lib,
/root, /shlib. Some key system files which should not be world writeable
include /etc/passwd, /etc/group, /etc/profile, /etc/vfstab
(default boot parameters), /etc/default/fs and /etc/dfs/fstypes (file system
types), /etc/initab, /sbin/init and /etc/bootrc (boot script).
Tools such as Tripwire ensure that system executables have
not been tampered with.
Alternatively, the AIX Trusted Computing Base (TCB) should
be expanded to include the system executables.
|
4.3
Password Composition & Management
4.3.1
|
Account names and passwords are not embedded in scripts,
files or applications.
|
If account names and passwords are embedded in login scripts, files
or applications,
anyone with read access to the scripts, files or applications (e.g. using the
strings command) could extract the username and password, and gain
unauthorized access to the system.
|
Account names and passwords should not be embedded in
executables or text files, including .netrc files.
|
4.4
Physical Access
4.4.1
|
A server key lock
facility is used (if available), and the key is removed and stored in a
secure location.
|
Key lock facilities can prevent illicit or unauthorized
use of the system.
|
Policies should be developed, implemented and effectively
communicated concerning the procedures for the proper use of the key lock
facility.
A key lock facility is used (if available) to prevent
unauthorized use or removal of a system. The key is removed and stored
in a secure location.
|
4.4.2
|
The server console is physically secured within a locked
facility.
|
With physical access to the server console, all system
security can be bypassed. It may be possible for unauthorized persons to
obtain confidential data located on the server, or even reboot and take
control over the server giving them instant root access without a password.
|
Develop and implement procedures to control physical
access to the system.
- Servers should be located in locked rooms with physical
access restricted to authorized personnel.
- Key or card access to these rooms should be limited to
those who have a job requirement to enter the room frequently.
- Visitors and vendors should be escorted at all times.
- Closed-circuit surveillance of the server room entrance
should be considered.
|
4.4.3
|
The system key lock is in the secure position.
|
Without this preventive measure, anyone with physical
access to the server could cause it to reboot off of any tape, diskette,
CD-ROM or hard drive, potentially allowing access to all information stored
on the server.
|
Ensure that the system key lock is in the secure position
and that the key is removed and securely stored.
|
4.4.4
|
The server's physical surroundings are designed for the
safety and availability of the system, including cleanliness (lack of
dust), appropriate and stable temperature
and humidity, and neat and controlled cabling.
|
If a computer is not stored in a clean, cool environment,
it may be subject to more breakdowns and loss of data.
|
Rooms containing critical servers should be
climate-controlled.
If conditions are inappropriate, take steps to correct.
|
5 Resource Access Controls
5.1 System
Configuration
5.1.1
|
Access to the Crontab command is limited. Best practices call for
only the root user
to have access.
|
The crontab command submits, edits, list, or remove cron
jobs. A cron job is a command run by the cron daemon at regularly scheduled
intervals. The crontab program is owned by root and run with the SUID bit
set. By default, everyone on the system can use the crontab command.
|
Review (using cat) the files cron.allow and cron.deny,
which control access to crontab. The files must be owned by root and members
of the sys group, with permissions mode 640. Under AIX, the crontab access
files are /etc/cron.d/cron.allow and cron.deny. The cron.allow file is
checked by the system first. This file must include all of the login names
(one name per line) of users allowed to use the crontab command. The root
user's login name (root) must be listed in the cron.allow file. The cron.deny
file must be used to list the login names of users who are not allowed to use
crontab. If neither the cron.deny nor the cron.allow file exists, only the
superuser can submit a job with the crontab command.
To allow root only, remove the two files:
/var/adm/cron/cron.deny
&
/var/adm/cron/cron.allow
Where necessary, add appropriate entries to the cron.allow
and cron.deny files.
To explicity allow a user to use crontab:
touch cron.allow
put the userid in it
To explicitly deny a user:
touch cron.deny
put the userid in it
|
5.1.2
|
Idle/inactive terminals are automatically locked or logged
out after a period of inactivity.
|
If accounts are not logged out (e.g. if the user doesn't
log out at lunchtime or the end of the work day) someone with physical access
to a terminal can gain access to sensitive information or install backdoors
allowing later access to the account.
|
Idle or inactive terminals should be automatically logged
out after 5-20 minutes of inactivity, depending on business needs and work
patterns. (TMOUT variable for the Korn shell, TIMEOUT for the Borne shell)
|
|
|
|
|
6 Privileges
6.1
User Accounts
6.1.1
|
Membership in privileged groups is limited to users with a
business necessity for such access.
|
Accounts listed in privileged groups, such as GID=0, have
access to group writeable files created and owned by the root user.
Allowing unauthorized users to have a GID=0 increases the risk that
sensitive
system configuration files will be changed or deleted.
|
Only necessary and authorized users belong to privileged
groups. Membership in privileged groups should be limited to users with a
business need for the access. Of
particular concern on AIX are the admin, adms and audit groups, whose
menbership should be tightly controlled. For the predefined AIX groups, users
should be added to the staff group
only, or locally created groups.
|
6.1.2
|
Regularly examine group definitions.
|
A common exploit is for an attacker to modify group
permissions and privileges so that their activities are possibly less
noticeable to the system administrator.
|
To examine user group definitions, use:
/usr/sbin/lsgroup `-fa` `id` `users` `ALL`
|
6.1.3
|
Regularly examine user information.
|
A common exploit is for an attacker to modify group
memberships for cracked accounts so that their activieites are possibly less
noticeable to the system administrator.
|
To examing user information, use (single command):
/user/sbin/lsuser `-fa` `id` `groups` `home`
`auditclasses` `login` `su` `rlogin` `telnet` `ttys` `ALL`
|
6.1.4
|
SUID and SGID programs are used only when no other
reasonable, more secure means exists for the function. Where such programs
are necessary, they are implemented in a secure manner, including limiting
access to such programs using group permissions.
|
If the SUID bit is set in the file permissions, the program
executes with the permissions
of the owner of the program in addition to the user executing it. For
example, ps, the process status program, is SUID to root because it needs to
read from system memory, something normal users are not allowed to do. The
SGID bit behaves in exactly the same way as the SUID bit, except that the
program operates with the permission of the group associated with the file. A
vulnerability in a SUID root program (e.g.) can lead to a root-level
compromise of the system. Accordingly, world writable SUID programs are
especially dangerous.
|
Where SUID or SGID programs are necessary, restrict access
to SUID and SGID programs by creating a group especially for that program.
This group should have execute permissions, while 'world' should not have
access to the program. The permission
bits on such a program would look like:
r-sr-x--- 1 root print 9872 Dec 28 17:44
print_cleaner
SUID programs should NOT be shell scripts, but should be
compiled from C or a similar language.
|
6.1.5
|
Disable direct logins for root.
|
Allowing for someone to log in directly as root is
dangerous because it removes a layer of authentication and it may be more
prone to a sniffing attack to capture the password.
|
Set 'User can LOGIN REMOTELY' = false' in SMIT CHANGE/SHOW
User Characteristics Screen.
|
6.1.6
|
If the system contains particularly sensitive data, or if
strong controls on privileged access are otherwise required, software
controls exist to manage and limit root access.
|
Root access gives complete control over the system,
including the power to crash the system or erase all data. While AIX is not
equipped by default with exceptionally strong controls on root activity, such
controls are available where necessary, in the form of free software such as
sudo and larger packages such as SeOS, CA or Tivoli Security Management.
These packages allow you to restrict which commands root can run, and to log
the activity of root users.
|
Utilize the Administrative Roles feature to achieve
greater separation of duties and to reduce the number of personnel requiring
the root account access.
Use a third-party facility to further partition root
functionality, if required. For
example, "sudo-root" accounts can be set up and used by system
operators to do system backups without providing full root functionality.
For sensitive data files, use ACLs to implement refined
access controls.
If sudo is not in use, inquire about the appropriateness
of using sudo.
Keep root users to a minimum.
To see which userids each user can use with su, use:
lsuser 'f ALL
|
6.2 System
Configuration
6.2.1
|
If the system contains particularly sensitive data, or if
strong controls on privileged access are otherwise required, software
controls exist to manage and limit root access.
|
Root access gives complete control over the system,
including the power to crash the system or erase all data. While AIX is not
equipped by default with exceptionally strong controls on root activity, such
controls are available where necessary, in the form of free software such as
sudo and larger packages such as SeOS, CA or Tivoli Security Management.
These packages allow you to restrict which commands root can run, and to log
the activity of root users.
|
Utilize the Administrative Roles feature to achieve
greater separation of duties and to reduce the number of personnel requiring
the root account access.
Use a third-party facility to further partition root
functionality, if required. For
example, "sudo-root" accounts can be set up and used by system
operators to do system backups without providing full root functionality.
For sensitive data files, use ACLs to implement refined
access controls.
If sudo is not in use, inquire about the appropriateness
of using sudo.
Keep root users to a minimum.
To see which userids each user can use with su, use:
lsuser 'f ALL
|
7
Accountability
7.1 Intrusion Detection
7.1.1
|
A regular program of logging and monitoring is in place.
|
Logging and monitoring is often ignored or under utilized
by system administrators, as it is often given a low priority by both IS and
other departments. However, it is the only way to ensure the effectiveness of
security measures, provide the opportunity to react to security breaches, and
collect evidence of potential intrusions.
|
A program of logging and monitoring is in place which
includes real-time monitoring and notification of potential intrusions.
|
7.1.2
|
Log files are not world writeable.
|
Log files provide the system audit trail and must be
properly protected from unauthorized modification.
|
Log files, including syslog and messages, should not be
writable by users other than root. Change permissions using the
command
chmod go-w syslog
|
7.1.3
|
The loginlog is not world writeable.
|
If the loginlog is world writeable, a intruder may delete
records of their attempts to gain access, decreasing the likelihood that that
their activities will be discovered.
|
The loginlog should not be writable by any user other than
root.
Change permissions using the command
chmod go-w loginlog
|
7.2 System Configuration
7.2.1
|
The "sticky bit" is set on all world-writeable
public directories.
|
If the sticky bit is not set on a world-writable
directory, files in that directory may be renamed or removed by users other
than the owner of the directory or file. Some applications create
temporary files in public directories; if the sticky bit is not set, an
intruder might be able to overwrite the temporary files and compromise the
application.
|
The sticky bit should be set on all public directories
which are normally world-writable, such as /tmp, /usr/tmp (/var/tmp) and
/usr/spool/uucppublic. Set the sticky bit using chmod +t <name>.
No sensitive or
confidential information should be written to files in these directories,
since any user can read them.
|
7.3 Logging
& Monitoring
7.3.1
|
Error logging should always be active.
|
Many times, security exposures happen because of errors
made. Recording and reviewing these errors can reduce the exposure they
potentially represent.
|
Ensure error logging is active ( the errdemon is running)
and review the error log regularly.
|
7.3.2
|
Examine failed logins frequently.
|
Failed logins can be an indication of possible attack
against the system.
|
Use the command:
/usr/bin/who '-s' '/etc/securtiy/failedlogin'
to generate a list of usernames that are unsuccessfully
used to access the system.
|
8 Remote Access
Management
8.1 User Accounts
8.1.1
|
Root login is restricted to the console.
|
If root login is not restricted to the console, then the
list of intruders who may attempt to directly gain root access increases from
only those with physical access to the system to (potentially) anyone in the
world. Users may still login to an unprivileged account and su to root.
|
Remote logins as root are not permitted.
|
8.1.2
|
.netrc files are implemented securely.
|
.netrc files can be a source of security risk because of
the authentication information they contain. The $HOME/.netrc file is
used by the ftp and rexec commands to allow
automatic login to remote hosts without specifying passwords, and
contains a list of host names, login
names, and unencrypted passwords and other information to use at the remote
hosts. This gives anyone with read
access to the .netrc file (root on the local host) the ID's and passwords of
remote systems.
|
Forbid the use of .netrc files unless they are absolutely
necessary (e.g.: the risk of disseminating remote passwords is acceptable).
To prevent the use of .netrc files, adhere to the
following standards:
1. They should not
contain passwords,
2. They should be
0 bytes, and
3. They should be
owned by root.
|
8.1.3
|
Users such as root, as well as various system accounts,
are not allowed to use FTP.
|
Use of FTP access through the root account allows an
additional remote path to supervisor level access by an intruder. Allowing
FTP from system accounts (such as bin, smtp and sys) which normally would not
require FTP also create additional paths into the system without providing an
offsetting business benefit.
|
Using a text editor, edit the file /etc/ftpusers. To disable ftp
access for a particular
account, add the name of the account to the file.
|
8.2
NFS
8.2.1
|
Use NFS only when necessary. Check regularly for unauthorized NFS
activation and use.
|
The NFS service allows for users to mount a systems
filesystems remotely. This service is
a common way to exploit a system and gain access to private information.
|
To check current NFS status use:
lssrc 'g nfs
To check if NFS is installed, use:
lslpp 'l | /bin/grep nfs
To check if NFS is active, use:
lssrc 'g nfs | /bin/grep active
To display which directories are exported, use:
cat /etc/xtab
To display which hosts are exporting directories, use:
/usr/bin/showmount
If the host is a client, to show what's mounted from
remote systems, use:
mount | grep 'v '^ '
|
8.2.2
|
File systems are not mounted writeable, absent a
compelling business justification. Executables are mounted read only, if at
all.
|
The default configuration of NFS is to grant full access
(read, write and execute) to all hosts to a mounted file system. Thus there
is a high chance of allowing access to unauthorized individuals.
Unauthenticated access to server executables can lead to
numerous security vulnerabilities due to flaws in the mounted programs.
Program coding mistakes which can become security exploits exist (whether
publicly known or not) in as many as
50% of programs.
|
The access control options, and recommended settings for
the /etc/export and etc/dfs/dfstab files are:
-ro=host, host - Exports the directory read-only. If this
option is not specified, the directory is exported with read-write
permission,
-access=host,host - Restricts access to only the named
hosts or netgroup name. If no -access option is specified, all hosts will
have access. The default value allows any machine to mount the directory,
-rw=host,host - Exports the directory read-write. This
mode of exporting inherently lowers directory security and must be
implemented with caution,
-root=host,host - Allows superuser access from the named
hosts. If NFS root access is not enabled for a remote NFS client, the root
UID of the server is mapped to a default UID of -2 or 60001 (the nobody
account) This restricts access against the superuser UID on a remote machine.
Exports specifying root access are inherently less security and must be
implemented with caution. The default is for no hosts to be granted root
access.
-secure - Requires NFS clients to use a more secure
protocol when accessing the directory.
Export only to fully-qualified host names to prevent
spoofing.
Revise where inappropriate.
Use ACLs to implement refined access controls; however, if it is a heterogeneous environment, do
not use ACL functions
|
8.2.3
|
NFS exported file systems are protected with access lists.
|
Entering a directory or filesystem in the /etc/exports
file without specifying an access list allows any host to mount the
directory.
|
NFS should be configured to allow for the minimum access
necessary. The number of servers
allowed to mount an exported file system whould be reduced to the minimum
necessary. If the /etc/exports file
does not specify a list of hosts for each exported file system, then NFS is
insecurely configured.
Additionally, do not use the 'root=' option unless
absolutely necessary.
|
8.2.4
|
NFS mounted files and directories are configured with
appropriately secure file permissions.
|
If individual file permissions in NFS mounted shares are
not configured for security, the likelihood that unauthorized users will have
access to sensitive information increases.
|
Files and directories on the server should be protected by
setting their owner to root and their protection mode to 755 (in the case of
programs and directories) or 644 (in the case of data files).
|
8.3 System
Configuration
8.3.1
|
Network services, including login, telnet, FTP, and HTTP
do not display system identifying banners prior to authentication. Instead, a
warning message displays a warning against unauthorized use.
|
Servers often display sensitive information by default,
such as the hostname, the OS version, and the server software version, e.g.
ftp.clienthost.com, AIX4.3.3, wuftp version2.14(b9). An intruder could then
attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in these software types (available
from public Internet databases). Legitimate users generally do not need to
know such information. A warning message may also be necessary for subsequent
prosecution of offenders.
|
Instead of banners that identify system type and other
sensitive information, network services display generic warning banners.
|
8.3.2
|
Only necessary network services are enabled. Where
necessary, services are only implemented in a secure manner, including IP
filtering, TCP Wrapper, and installation with the latest software patches.
|
Unintended network access can be granted by computers that
have more services enabled that is necessary. UNIX systems often are
configured "out of the box" with numerous network services that are
often unneeded, such as the Berkeley R commands (rshell, rexec and rlogin)
and obsolete network testing services
such as echo, discard and chargen. After installation, system administrators
will often install unnecessary services, because they, or their managers,
underestimate the security concerns involved. If a service is not
enabled, it cannot be used to break in to
the system.
|
Remove all unnecessary services by commenting them out of
the inetd.conf file (restarting the inetd process is required at this point
(kill 'HUP <pid>) or out of the appropriate boot script, as necessary
(by placing a comment mark (#) at the beginning of the lines describing the
service).
To verify inet services running use:
netserv 's 'S -X
|
8.3.3
|
Rlogin and rshell are used only if an approved business
justification exists.
|
Rlogin and rsh provide remote virtual terminal and remote
execution services similar to Telnet and rexec. However:
a. rlogind and rshd do not require that the user type his
login name; the login name is automatically transmitted at the start of the
connection.
b. If the connection comes from a trusted host (via
hosts.equiv) or trusted user (via .rhosts), rlogind and rshd will accept the
connection without requiring a password.
|
The use of rshd and rlogind is not allowed unless a viable
business justification exists. Employ
secure methods for remote shells and remote logins that include advanced
authentication and encryption (e.g., Secure Shell- SSH).
|
8.3.4
|
Tftpd is disabled except on servers which act as a boot
host. On these servers, tftp is
configured securely.
|
The Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is used to allow
users to retrieve files without requiring an account on the remote system.
TFTP is an unauthenticated file transfer service. It is commonly used for
booting diskless workstations and downloading server code or fonts for
X-terminals over the network. Many implementations of TFTP have security
problems. In particular, unrestricted TFTP access allows remote intruders to
retrieve a copy of any world-readable file without authentication, such as
/etc/passwd.
|
If TFTP is required, restrict access to server files so
that sensitive files can not be retrieved remotely via tftp. You may
want to talk to Chris Watson
regarding this. He may have some
stuff that could help us improve this section.
|
8.3.5
|
The finger daemon is only used if an approved business
justification exists, and then only in a secure manner.
|
The Finger daemon service allows a remote user to obtain
information about local users, such
as their user name, full name, home
directory, last login time, and in some cases when she last received and/or
read her mail. The fingerd program allows users (and intruders) on remote
hosts to obtain this information.
|
If the finger service is necessary, a newer version should
be run which requires that a user name be provided along with any
request. This keeps arbitrary
outsiders from obtaining a complete list of users logged in to the server.
|
8.3.6
|
The FTP daemon is only used if an approved business
justification exists.
|
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) allows users to connect
to remote systems and transfer files. FTP may be used in either authenticated
(where a plaintext username and password are required) or anonymous (no
username or password required) mode, depending on system configuration. In
either case, FTP allows remote access to the server's files, without secure
authentication. FTP is an issue both because it allows remote users access to
the file system and because legitimate users have been known to unwittingly
store sensitive corporate information on publically available FTP sites.
|
If FTP is required, it should be enabled with the
following standard:
1. Only the latest
release (including patches) should be used, as various FTP servers have
security bugs that allow intruders to break into the system,
2. Anonymous FTP
is not allowed, and
3. The
/etc/ftpusers file is utilized to restrict login from defined accounts.
|
8.3.7
|
The remote printer daemon is securely configured.
|
The /etc/hosts.lpd file is used to specify the remote
hosts that are allowed to communicate with the lpd printer daemon and access
local printer queues. An improper configuration can lead to unauthorized root
access.
|
Edit the hosts.lpd file as necessary, using a text editor.
Change file permissions using:
chmod 640 /etc/hosts.lpd
|
8.3.8
|
The Rexec daemon is only used if an approved business justification
exists.
|
The rexec (RPC remote program execution) allows users to
execute commands on remote computers without prior authentication.
|
The use of rexecd is not allowed unless a viable business
justification exists. Employ a secure methods for remote command
execution that employs advanced authentication and encryption (e.g., Secure
Shell- SSH).
|
8.3.9
|
The Telnet daemon is only used if an approved business
justification exists.
|
Telnet provides remote virtual terminal service similar to
that provided by a dial-up modem. Usernames and passwords are susceptible to
sniffing, as they are transmitted in plaintext. On the other hand, even
without a known username and password, telnet is susceptible to remote
attack. Because it is significantly faster to connect with telnet than it is
to call up with a modem, an attacker can try to guess more passwords in a
given amount of time. Also, it is often easier (and less expensive) to call a
computer anonymously on the Internet than over the phone lines.
|
If telnet functionality is needed, the standard telnet
server is replaced with a program which encrypts passwords, such as ssh.
Limit access to those accounts with a business
justification through the accounts' LOGIN REMOTELY fields.
|
8.3.10
|
UUCP is only used
if necessary for an approved business purposes.
|
All versions of UNIX provide a rudimentary form of
networking called UUCP, which allows files and electronic mail to be
transferred, as well as remote command execution. Installation of the UUCP
subsystem is not recommended: a) there is no pairing of a single individual
with a UID on UUCP, b) many UUCP systems are configured with anonymous
logins. Unless UUCP is carefully configured, sensitive information can be
stolen and files can be sent to your system that can compromise security.
|
UUCP can be disabled by changing the 'home directory' and
'shell' fields of the uucp passwd file entry to '/dev/null'.
Disable UUCP-related commands such as uucp, uulog, uuname,
uupick, uusend, uustat, uuto, uux, as well as commands in /usr/lib/uucp (Note
that the uuencode and uudecode commands should not be disabled, as they are
used by other applications such as mail clients. However, make sure that
uuencode is not SUID, or else the user could accidentally create SUID
executables).
|
8.3.11
|
X Windows is only used if necessary for an approved business
purposes. If required, it
is implemented in a secure manner, using secure shell to encrypt X
traffic. Lets either use Xwindows or
X Windows.
|
We need to have 'Impact(s)' discussed.
|
If X windows is not needed, it should be disabled by
editing the AIX rc startup files and commenting out the line which starts X
windows.
If X windows is needed, it may be configured to use an
encrypting "tunnel" such as
Secure Shell.
|
8.3.12
|
Direct modem access to servers is only used if necessary
for an approved business purpose; if necessary it is implemented in a secure
manner.
|
It is not uncommon for systems to be configured with
insecure direct modem access, either 'out of the box' or thereafter by
non-security conscious administrators. Dial-up modems allow anyone who knows
the correct telephone number to access the system and try to break in. For
example, it is not uncommon for the modem to have no password, or a simple
password such as 'guest'. Also, if improperly configured, modems may allow an
attacker to call a system and obtain access to an already logged-in line that
another user has unknowingly left behind.
|
Several options are available for increasing modem
security.
If practical, dial-back modems should be used.
Hardware tokens is a secure way of providing remote
access, and should be used if at all possible
|
8.3.13
|
hosts.equiv files are not used to establish trust
relationships.
|
The file /etc/hosts.equiv is used to establish global,
password-less trust relationships between remote systems and the server,
similar to .rhosts files (the system actually checks hosts.equiv first, then
.rhosts if no matches are found).
|
/etc/hosts.equiv files are not used to establish trust
relationships between hosts.
No application should need unauthenticated access to
another server. If such applications
exist and are mission-critical, they should be configured to make narrow use
of the .rhosts feature of AIX while alternative applications are investigated
or developed internally.
|
Table of Contents
Standards - HACMP
HACMP Standards
Mt Xia's HACMP standards are contained within the
following document:
Unix-HACMP-Presentation.pdf
Table of Contents
Standards - Installation
Installation Standards
Table of Contents
Standards - Monitoring
Monitoring Standards
Table of Contents
Standards - Patch Management
Patch Management Standards
Table of Contents
Standards - Tivoli TEC
Table of Contents
Procedures
The procedures used to support the Policies, Guidelines, and Standards
implemented in the Power 5 environment, are described here.
Table of Contents
Procedures - Frames
Frame Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Microcode
Microcode Management
Systems without an HMC
Use IBM's
Microcode Discovery Service at the following URL to determine what
microcode should be updated, to retrieve the microcode, and the
instructions for installing the microcode.
https://techsupport.services.ibm.com/server/aix.invscoutMDS
Normally the "java applet" is used to peform the microcode discovery
which requires the password for the user "invscout" to be set. This
also requires internet communication from the system over port 808. To
use the java applet perform the following steps on the target
system:
- Set the password for the user "invscout"
passwd invscout
- Clear the password administration flags on the user "invscout"
pwdadm -c invscout
- Start the "invscout" daemon
invscoutd
- The system is now ready for microcode discovery via the java applet
- The microcode discovery service will require several pieces of
information to be able to perform the survey:
- Fully qualified hostname of the system
- Password for the user "invscout"
- Port number (default: 808)
- System Model Number
lsattr -El sys0 -a modelname -F value
- System Serial Number
lsattr -El sys0 -a systemid -F value
Systems with an HMC
Use the facilities built into the HMC for performing microcode updates
to all managed systems.
Table of Contents
Procedures - Storage
Storage Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Hostname/Alias
Hostname Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - HMC
HMC Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - VIO Server
Virtual I/O Server Procedures
The procedures referenced by this document are related to the design,
implementation, configuration and management of the AIX Virtual I/O
Server (VIO Server).
Table of Contents
Procedures - PLM
Partition Load Manager Policies
The documents referenced here describe procedures related to the
Partition Load Manager (PLM). The Partition Load Manager (PLM) provides
CPU and memory resource management and monitoring across logical
partitions (LPARs). Partition Load Manager allows you to effectively use
CPU and Memory resources by allowing you to set thresholds for
designated resources. When a threshold is exceeded, Partition Load
Manager can try to assign CPU and/or Memory resources to that LPAR by
using resources assigned to other LPARs that are not being used.
Table of Contents
Procedures - LPAR
Logical Partition Procedures
The procedures referenced by this document provide instructions for
configuring an LPAR in several different environments. Those
environments include:
- Dedicated Resources
- Shared Resources
- Virtualized Resources
Table of Contents
Procedures - NIM
Network Information Manager Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Resource Group
Resource Group Name Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - WLM AIX 433
Workload Manager for AIX 4.3.3.0 Procedures
- WLM/Jtopas Trending Setup: Performance Data Gathering
-
This procedure describes how to setup the AIX Workload Manager (WLM)
and Jtopas to store trending information to a central location via
NFS.
Table of Contents
Procedures - WLM AIX 5
Workload Manager for AIX 5L Procedures
- WLM/Jtopas Trending Setup: Performance Data Gathering
-
This procedure describes how to setup the AIX Workload Manager (WLM)
and Jtopas to store trending information to a central location via
NFS.
Table of Contents
Procedures - VG Name
Volume Group Name Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - LV Name
Logical Volume Name Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - JFS Logs
JFS Log Logical Volume Name Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - FS Mt Point
File System Mount Point Directory Name Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - User/UID
User Name Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Group/GID
Group Name Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Security
Security Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - HACMP
HACMP Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Installation
Installation Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Monitoring
Monitoring Procedures
- WLM/Jtopas Trending Setup: Performance Data Gathering
-
This procedure describes how to setup the AIX Workload Manager (WLM)
and Jtopas to store trending information to a central location via
NFS.
- WLM/Jtopas Trending Setup on VIO Server: Performance Data Gathering
-
This procedure describes how to setup the AIX Workload Manager (WLM) and
Jtopas to store trending information from a VIO server to a central
location via NFS.
- AIX Workload Manager (WLM) Procedures
-
Procedures for configuring the Workload Manager (WLM) on an AIX Power 5
system and utilizing the information generated.
- AIX 4.3.3 Workload Manager (WLM) Procedures
-
Procedures for configuring the Workload Manager (WLM) on an AIX Power 4
system and utilizing the information generated.
Table of Contents
Procedures - Patch Management
Patch Management Procedures
Table of Contents
Procedures - Tivoli TEC
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
- viohdlm VIO HDLM Parms
Virtual I/O Server Procedures
The procedures referenced by this document are related to the design,
implementation, configuration and management of the AIX Virtual I/O
Server (VIO Server).
Table of Contents